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Abstract 
Ecological compensation is commonly employed but rarely evaluated around the 
world. In order to assess application of the tool in New Zealand, a systematic 
nationwide review was undertaken. The research used a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative tools (i.e. a mixed methods approach) to investigate 
outcomes associated with ecological compensation under the Resource 
Management Act 1991 and how variation among outcomes might be explained. 
Three key research components were addressed: compliance, practice and 
stakeholder perspectives. 
Compliance 
The levels of regulatory compliance were assessed in 81 consents and 245 
conditions with an overall compliance level of 64.8%. Public organisations 
(75.5%) were more likely to comply than private companies (65.5%), followed by 
private individuals (54.7%). Administrative conditions (paper-based) were much 
more likely to be complied with (82.6%) than non-administrative (action based) 
conditions (49.6%). There were significant differences in compliance rates across 
different activities from Agriculture (4.8%) through to Energy Generation (100%), 
demonstrating the importance of understanding the nature of non-compliance in 
improving regulatory compliance and enforcement.  
Practice 
The recognition of key implementation issues of ecological compensation were 
investigated based on the ecological exchanges approved in 110 consents. The key 
implementation issues were (1) equivalency, (2) spatial proximity, (3) 
additionality, (4) timing, (5) duration and compliance, and (6) currencies and 
ratios. Most exchanges approved under the RMA were ‘in-kind’ (i.e. broadly 
similar in type) but that their ecological equivalence was difficult to determine 
due to poor information. Most exchanges were close to the site of impact (65.5%), 
and those at a distance were typically the result of aggregated schemes such as 
mitigation trusts. Most requirements for ecological compensation can be 
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considered to be additional, as there are few other means of compelling ecological 
restoration or other positive conservation activities in New Zealand. Most 
ecological compensation (94.5%) was required to be delivered concurrent with or 
after the activity that was approved with a range of mechanisms used to secure 
those outcomes. This research also showed that currencies and ratios are rarely 
used in the determination of ecological compensation. 
Stakeholder perspectives 
 Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 116 stakeholders from a wide 
range of disciplines, and demonstrated that while the potential of ecological 
compensation is well understood and its use is well-supported (96.5%), most 
stakeholders have significant concerns about implementation. Strong support 
(87.9%) exists for a more robust and formalized approach to ecological 
compensation. 
For ecological compensation to contribute positively to the management of effects 
on the environment, the exchanges of biodiversity lost and gained must be robust. 
The present research has demonstrated that the implementation of ecological 
compensation in New Zealand is falling short of this expectation, and has 
identified a range of areas for improvement. The significant potential for failure 
inherent within ecological compensation requires mitigation with policy and 
practice improvements, and comprehensive follow-up and review of outcomes. 
Changes in the use of ecological compensation in New Zealand, toward a context 
that supports more robust exchanges and limits the potential for negative impact 
of the tool upon ecosystems and species are essential. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Overview 
Compensating for ecological harm is a policy tool that is growing in its relevance 
and application worldwide. Ecological compensation falls within a rubric of 
activities known by various names around the world including mitigation, 
compensatory mitigation, habitat banking/offsets, and biodiversity offsets.  
Compensatory mechanisms are used in many jurisdictions around the world, 
presenting an opportunity for agencies, communities and developers to come to 
more flexible arrangements on land development and resource use, beyond typical 
command-and-control techniques. Agencies and developers can reach agreements 
that mandate ecological compensation, which can alleviate the adversarial nature 
of the planning process, contribute to local, regional or national conservation 
goals and at the same time, secure control over resources and land for extractive 
or development purposes.  
Economic growth is constrained by significant environmental features on the 
landscape, and ecological compensation as a mechanism can act to limit those 
constraints, making the concept very attractive (Cowell, 1997). However, reviews 
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of the implementation of the concept (such as the wetland mitigation banking 
schemes in the United States) have seen it widely criticised due to poor 
compliance and enforcement, among other factors, meaning that ecological goals 
are not realised (Burgin, 2010; Department of Environment and Conservation 
NSW, 2006; Hornyak & Halvorsen, 2003; Matthews & Endress, 2008). There are 
also concerns about how to underwrite for failure of compensation projects, and 
where to allocate responsibility for long term monitoring of compliance and 
success (Burgin, 2008; Gibbons & Lindenmayer, 2007; Tonkin & Taylor, 2012).  
Some authors go further, and suggest that not only does the concept contain 
fundamental errors, but that it will simply not work. For example, and most 
prominently, Walker et al (2009) argued that agency behaviour would see the 
mechanism used to facilitate inappropriate exchanges at the expense of the 
environment. While most authors conclude that administrative improvements, 
technical solutions and improved practice overall will enhance outcomes, Walker 
et al contend that such proposed ‘fixes’ will not arrest the likelihood of failure of 
such schemes and concluding that overall trading of biodiversity will generate 
poorer ecological outcomes than traditional approaches (i.e. rules and 
prohibitions). 
The regulatory appeal of ecological compensation is a major contributor to 
concerns (both suspected and actual) regarding its effective implementation. It is 
politically more palatable to allow developments, and agencies can promote the 
practice to avoid an unpopular decision of declining a proposal (Walker et al, 
2009). More broadly, weak frameworks, poor institutional design, inappropriate 
application of the concept and lax follow-up and enforcement exacerbate this 
inherent bias, placing vulnerable biodiversity at risk (Matthews & Endress 2008, 
Salzman & Ruhl, 2000). Further, the promise of biodiversity gains not otherwise 
facilitated by low conservation spending can weaken traditional arguments against 
the practice by both agencies and other players (i.e. conservation interests). For 
example, the impact of invasive species in New Zealand contributes to an often 
significant background rate of ecological decline. This provides for developers to 
offer pest control measures in offset scenarios and argue (and often quite correctly 
so) that the context with the offset is better for the ecosystems at stake than the 
status quo (typically beset by non-existent or low-intensity pest management). For 
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these reasons and more, the bias toward the affirmative in development is 
unsurprising. There is no doubt of the risk of ecological compensation to 
ecosystems, and this is a central consideration in the present research – can we fix 
the implementation of ecological compensation and if not, is there a viable 
alternative? 
Returning to the promises of ecological compensation, Gibbons and Lindenmayer 
(2007) noted that although schemes surrounding compensation had many 
shortcomings, they hold potential if the shortcomings were understood and 
acknowledged within policy and practice. Introducing the principle of ecological 
compensation is also an early step in allowing the costs of environmental harm to 
be integrated into markets and recognised in development projects (Brownlie et 
al., 2007). Ecological compensation does promise a number of potential benefits 
to developers, regulatory agencies, the community and the environment. The 
many potential benefits means calls to dismiss the concept as unworkable must be 
carefully considered as they are unlikely to be practical, at least in the short term 
(Gibbons & Lindenmayer, 2007; ten Kate et al., 2004).  
In order to address deficiencies of implementation, research is needed to 
understand the complexities of the concept as it applies to a given jurisdiction. 
The current research aimed to address this gap in understanding of how ecological 
compensation is used under the Resource Management Act 1991. Providing a 
greater understanding of implementation will enable New Zealand to assess 
whether the deficiencies are terminal to the use of the concept, or whether they 
may be managed with policy tools and other mechanisms. 
1.2 Research topic 
Ecological compensation is used in New Zealand as a mechanism to address 
adverse effects on the environment. No formal policy yet exists to guide the 
consideration or implementation of the concept however. Numerous authors have 
reviewed its place in resource management to date (Christensen, 2007; Memon & 
Skelton, 2004; Memon et al., 2004; Norton, 2008; Turner, 2000). Policy 
evaluation is rare (Bennear & Coglianese, 2004), and where policy on a matter is 
patchy or does not exist, it can be assumed that evaluation of outcomes is even 
less likely. The present research aimed to investigate the use of the concept in 
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New Zealand and provide an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
current approach. To do this, levels of compliance were investigated, planning 
practice was examined, and the views of stakeholders collected, with respect to 
ecological compensation under the Resource Management Act 1991. 
Definition of terms in this topic area is complex, as they vary enormously across 
jurisdictions and change with some frequency depending on progression of policy, 
case law and the wider discourse (Briggs et al., 2009; International Council on 
Mining and Metals, 2005; ten Kate, et al., 2004). In New Zealand the discussion 
has been no less perplexing than elsewhere, and serves as something of a barrier 
to a coherent discussion (Christensen, 2008). The terms of ecological 
compensation, biodiversity offsetting, and mitigation are typically employed to 
describe, somewhat interchangeably, the same concept: that of the 
counterbalancing of adverse ecological effects with positive ecological actions. 
The variation exists in the goals, the structure and parameters within which 
ecological compensation is delivered, and the method of demonstrating that it will 
be delivered. In the present research the focus was on ecological exchanges, 
although similar concepts are used in the fields of landscape, amenity, visual 
character and heritage under the broader banner of ‘environmental compensation’. 
Ecological compensation is therefore defined for the purposes of this research as: 
“Positive conservation actions required by resource consent, and intended 
to compensate for residual adverse effects of development and resource 
use” 
1.3 Research questions 
The primary goal of this research was to conduct an analysis of the use of 
ecological compensation in New Zealand. In a policy vacuum, the evaluation of 
practice and outcomes is very challenging and it is important that such analyses 
are objective and empirical. In order to conduct a systematic investigation, a series 
of methodologies was designed to glean information from the sources available 
(existing case studies, literature from New Zealand and around the world, case 
law and the views of stakeholders). From this the aim was to produce a series of 
multi-scale recommendations that would be useful to agencies and organisations 
engaged in the negotiation, approval and delivery of ecological compensation.  
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Principal question: What outcomes are associated with ecological compensation 
agreements under the Resource Management Act 1991 and how might the 
variation among outcomes be explained? 
1. What are the levels of compliance with ecological compensation 
requirements in consents under the Resource Management Act 1991, and 
how might variation in compliance levels be explained? This key question 
is addressed in Chapter 4, Compliance.  
2. How is ecological compensation considered in practice by agencies under 
the RMA, with respect to key implementation issues? This question is 
addressed in Chapter 5, Practice. 
3. What are the perspectives of stakeholders on the implementation of 
ecological compensation under the RMA and the possible improvements 
that are required? This question is addressed in Chapter 6, Stakeholder 
Perspectives. 
1.4 Thesis structure 
The core of this thesis comprises a series of papers submitted to international 
journals. Additional information is included to provide the basis for the papers, 
articulate the research approach used and, later, summarise the key findings and 
outline the contribution to new knowledge. The three papers each address one of 
the three key research questions related to compliance, practice and stakeholder 
views. The parts of the thesis and how they fit together are summarised below.  
Chapter 2 is a review of the literature relating to ecological compensation, from 
both New Zealand and around the world. Ecological compensation is a point at 
which numerous disciplines converge, including planning, conservation, ecology 
and law. It holds a contentious place in most resource management regimes 
globally, and has been subject to much criticism due to its perceived and actual 
adverse consequences. It also holds significant promise, as a tool to leverage 
conservation gains from what would otherwise be situations where there would be 
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certain losses. Understanding the role of ecological compensation, the genesis of 
the concept and the research to date on its application in New Zealand is crucial 
background to the following chapters.  
Chapter 3 provides a description of the research process, including a discussion 
of the mixed methods approach as it relates to the research topic. The tools and 
methods used to address each of the key research questions are also described, 
including both data collection and analysis techniques. Chapter 3 also details the 
assumptions and limitations of the research undertaken. 
Chapter 4 is an analysis of regulatory compliance with ecological compensation 
requirements required by 81 resource consents around the country designed to 
answer Key Question 1.  
What are the levels of compliance with ecological compensation requirements in 
consents under the Resource Management Act 1991, and how might variation in 
compliance levels be explained? 
I aimed to understand not simply levels of compliance, but the factors that had a 
significant impact upon that compliance. I considered that describing the nature of 
non-compliance with ecological compensation would enable more specific 
recommendations to arise as to how to improve practice and what operational 
factors are more conducive to positive outcomes. Chapter 4 has been published in 
Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal Vol 31 pp.34-44 as “Ecological 
compensation: an evaluation of regulatory compliance in New Zealand” by M A 
Brown, B D Clarkson, B J Barton and C Joshi. While I was the principal author 
and undertook all data collection and writing, my co-authors provided advice on 
research design, analysis and editing. 
Chapter 5 analyses the consideration of ecological compensation through the 
planning process in 110 resource consents to address Key Question 2.  
How is ecological compensation considered in practice by agencies under the 
RMA, with respect to key implementation issues?  
In the absence of specific goals and policy frameworks, I use the key 
implementation issues for biodiversity offsets proposed by McKenney and 
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Kiesecker (2010). The key implementation issues and the wider discussion within 
the paper provide a basis for a comparison of New Zealand with countries around 
the world. Chapter 5 has been published by the New Zealand Journal of Ecology 
as “Compensating for ecological harm- the state of play in New Zealand” by M A 
Brown, B D Clarkson, R T Theo Stephens and B J Barton Vol 38 (1) (in press). 
While I was the principal author and undertook all data collection and writing, my 
co-authors provided advice on research design, conceptual basis, data analysis and 
editing. 
Chapter 6 describes the outcomes of a series of semi-structured interviews with a 
wide range of practitioners and other stakeholders across New Zealand undertaken 
to address Key Question 3.  
What are the perspectives of stakeholders on the implementation of ecological 
compensation under the RMA and the possible improvements that are required? 
The research allowed me to utilise views of some of the most experienced of New 
Zealand professionals and others in implementing the concept, to build a picture 
of its promise and its pitfalls, and how each might be better recognised. The line 
of questioning was intentionally broad, and the sometimes lengthy interviews 
provided rich data on the nature of implementation of ecological compensation in 
what is nationally a policy vacuum. Chapter 6 has been published in the Journal 
of the Royal Society of New Zealand as “Implementing ecological compensation – 
stakeholder perspectives and a way forward” by M A Brown, B D Clarkson, B J 
Barton and C Joshi (in press). While I was the principal author and undertook all 
data collection and writing, my co-authors provided advice on research design, 
analysis and editing. 
Chapter 7 reviews and draws together the key lessons from the three papers, and 
demonstrates the original contribution of the present research to knowledge. 
Central to this synthesis is the section on recommendations, where I draw on the 
results of the core research to consider how the implementation of ecological 
compensation can be improved in New Zealand. 
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1.5 Summary 
The present research takes an objective and empirical approach to discerning the 
nature of New Zealand’s experience with ecological compensation to date and the 
outcomes that have been generated. As pioneering work in this jurisdiction, it 
takes a broad national view and traverses a wide range of issues, cases and 
contexts. The scale of the investigation is necessarily large in order to capture a 
significant degree of variation already present, and it hopefully provides 
something of a foundation for further work in this area, particularly in relation to 
the recommended future research detailed in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 2 
The genesis of ecological compensation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 The ailing environment 
The impact of human actions on Earth’s living systems has been phenomenal in 
degree and speed. Entire ecosystems, species and habitats face severe negative 
impacts as a result of human activities including land use changes, habitat 
removal, pollution and resource extraction. Such impacts – far from abating – 
have been shown to be intensifying (Earl et al., 2010; Eppink & Bergh, 2007; 
Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2010; Wood, 2010). The 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment estimated that 60% of global ecosystem 
services are being ‘degraded or used unsustainably, as the human population 
continues to grow and overshoot the carrying capacity of the planet (Guth, 2008; 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2006; Secretariat of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, 2010). The persistence of the development imperative and 
perilous state of ecosystems demand new approaches to striking this critical 
balance (Kiesecker et al., 2009; Underwood, 2011). The implicit desire to achieve 
balance between these competing elements is a common tenet of environmental 
law, one of concern to several authors as it ultimately favours economic interests 
over environmental interests (Guth, 2008; Murray & Swaffield, 1994; Salzman & 
Ruhl, 2000). 
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Regulation of and restriction upon human behaviour regarding the use of 
ecological resources occurs in most jurisdictions throughout the world, and have 
existed in some form or another for most of the history of civilisation (Wood, 
2010). Wood (2010) refers to environmental law as a ‘membrane through which 
individuals act in relation to nature’ and separates it from other forms of law 
because it is “accountable to a supreme set of laws – the law of nature...” Strong 
environmental policies are only becoming more critical as the state of ecosystems 
degrades and the need for resources continually increases (TEEB – The 
Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity for National and International Policy 
Makers – Summary: Responding to the Value of Nature 2009, 2009). As much as 
the goal of environmental law is to achieve protection of ecological systems, 
decisions made within it demand consideration of much more than the 
environment alone (Frances & Warren, 1999). Health and safety, human rights, 
amenity and landscape values, the economic development imperative, resource 
requirements, heritage and cultural associations and other societal needs must be 
considered, all against a backdrop of limited funding for conservation and wider 
resource management (Faith & Walker, 2002; Frances & Warren, 1999).   
2.2 Ecological compensation - background 
Ecological compensation is an example of a tool in environmental law that 
attempts to reconcile the continued provision for development and resource use 
with negative ecological effects, while attempting to retain, protect and restore 
ecological values (Gibbons & Lindenmayer, 2007; Maron et al., 2012; Memon & 
Skelton, 2004; Norton, 2007; Pilgrim et al., 2013; ten Kate et al., 2004). It is 
considered by some authors as necessary, particularly where those effects will not 
or cannot cease now or in the near future (Gibbons & Lindenmayer, 2007; ten 
Kate, et al., 2004). Ecological compensation is a tool to assist in the 
internalisation of environmental externalities, a central theme of environmental 
economics (Endres, 2010). The concept also recognises that the effort to protect 
biodiversity on public land alone is not enough (Reid, 2011), and that abatement 
of effects and enhancement of ecological values on private land are also essential 
(Broberg, 2003; Gordon et al., 2011; Kontoleon et al., 2007).  
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The origin of ecological compensation has been variously described as US 
wetland mitigation banking in the 1970s (Burgin, 2008; Walker, 2010), ‘planning 
gain’ in the United Kingdom (Whatmore & Boucher, 1993) and the 
‘compensation principle’ in use in Germany since the 1970s (Rundcrantz & 
Skarback, 2003). Ecological compensation is conceptually broad and is now 
implemented in a variety of ways around the world (Burgin, 2010; Gordon, et al., 
2011; Madsen et al., 2010; Memon & Skelton, 2004; Naicker, 2008; Reid, 2011).  
The variation exists in the goals of the compensation programme, the structure 
and parameters within which it is delivered, and the methods of demonstrating 
that it will be delivered.  
Ecological compensation includes negotiated one-off exchanges under the banner 
of ‘mitigation’ or ‘compensation’, through to more formal and quantitative 
biodiversity offsets. While some approaches to determining ecological 
compensation are heavily quantitative and formulated on the basis of relatively 
strict ratios, most programmes (whether policy-based or ad hoc) rely upon a 
significant degree of negotiation between parties to arrive at a solution that is 
socially acceptable (Galatowitsch, 2012; Johnson et al., 2002). More strategic and 
landscape-level systems, sometimes using methods and approaches derived from 
systematic conservation planning, are also being applied including habitat and 
species banking that operate as auctions (Briggs et al., 2009; Burgin, 2008; 
Department of Environment and Conservation NSW, 2006; Kontoleon, et al., 
2007; Margules & Pressey, 2000; Pawliczek & Sullivan, 2011). Such approaches 
often enshrine market-based principles, and are viewed as operating more 
transparently or efficiently than traditional approaches (Kontoleon, et al., 2007).  
Environmental economics provides a useful theoretical framework for some 
elements of ecological compensation, particularly with respect to resource 
valuation, contract design and the actual and potential effects of information 
asymmetry, imperfect knowledge of the commodity and the impact of transaction 
costs and discount rates (Kontoleon, et al., 2007). Environmental economics 
recognises at biodiversity is deeply complex and poorly understood and therefore 
is difficult to appropriately value (Field & Field, 2006; Salzman & Ruhl, 2000; 
Walker, 2010). The explicit role of environmental economics in ecological 
compensation varies with jurisdiction, depending upon the degree to which a 
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market approach is used, but it is well acknowledged that ecological 
compensation draws heavily on the underlying principles of environmental 
economics to inform policy approaches (Beder, 2000; Gustafsson, 1998; 
Hallwood, 2007).  
Tools derived from environmental economics to manage ecological compensation 
have caused concern due to the assumptions of fungibility of biodiversity that are 
inherent in such an approach (Freese & Trauger, 2000; Pawliczek & Sullivan, 
2011; Reid, 2011; Salzman & Ruhl, 2000; Walker, 2010; Walker et al., 2009). A 
key insight of environmental economics is that when a commodity has no price, it 
is viewed as free and therefore used at a rate that exceeds what is socially or 
ecologically desirable or sustainable (Gowdy, 1997). The commodification of 
biodiversity to some degree, however imperfect, has been seen as necessary to 
ensure the damage to it in the course of economic development is not ignored 
(Endres, 2010). The market exchange value of biodiversity therefore, only 
represents a fraction of the overall value of biodiversity, which includes market 
and non-market values to humans, other species and ecosystems (Gowdy, 1997).  
Approaches to ecological compensation, whether regulatory or voluntary, market-
based or ad hoc, that seek to trade biodiversity values are inherently risky, and a 
wide range of guidance schemes and approaches has been developed around the 
world to manage that risk (TBC, 2012). One example is the Business for 
Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP), an international alliance of industry, 
NGOs and government agencies which has released a range of documents and a 
list of guiding principles for offsetting (Business and Biodiversity Offsets 
Programme, 2009). Programmes like BBOP recognise that scientific input is only 
one aspect of successfully meeting the challenge of ecological compensation and 
other conservation challenges, and that positive outcomes can arise from 
collaborative engagement across sectors (Business and Biodiversity Offsets 
Programme, 2009; Phillis et al., 2012). 
2.3 Ecological compensation – key elements 
The literature on the various types of ecological compensation contains common 
themes including that assessment of ecological compensation (the mandatory 
form) typically occurs within the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
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process relevant to that jurisdiction. EIA is a long-established process that 
provides the regulatory starting point for determination of the degree of impacts 
(Morrison-Saunders & Bailey, 1999; Villarroya & Puig, 2009). EIA enshrines the 
concept of trade-offs, one of which is ecological compensation (Brown et al., 
2013; Faith & Walker, 2002; Morrison-Saunders & Pope, 2013; Puig & 
Villarroya, 2013; Rundcrantz & Skarback, 2003). Monitoring of project impacts 
and implementation is also covered in the field of EIA, although this is widely 
regarded as an often neglected element (Bailey & Hobbs, 1990; Khanal, 2007; 
Marshall et al., 2005; Villarroya & Puig, 2009). 
Inherent within ecological compensation – and indeed EIA more generally – is the 
concept of the mitigation hierarchy, which acts to focus compensatory efforts on 
the effects that remain (i.e are residual) after impacts have been avoided and 
directly remediated as far as possible (Business and Biodiversity Offsets 
Programme, 2009; McKenney & Kiesecker, 2010; Quertier & Lavorel, 2011; ten 
Kate, et al., 2004; Villarroya & Puig, 2009). In addition to the mitigation 
hierarchy, it is critical that policy and/or practice recognise that there are limits to 
what can be offset (Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme, 2009; Pilgrim, 
et al., 2013; Reid, 2011). Negative outcomes are unavoidable if components that 
cannot be adequately offset are lost to development pressure, such as threatened 
species, relict environments and other vulnerable ecosystems.  
2.3.1 Goals of compensating for harm 
The implicit and explicit goal of ecological compensation is to counterbalance 
adverse effects on the environment and to achieve some measure of equivalence 
in doing so (Maron, et al., 2012). Goals of schemes range from non-specific 
desires for broad equivalency, through the rigorous benchmark of achieving no 
net loss of biodiversity, to the even more onerous requirement to have the overall 
project achieve a net gain in biodiversity (Brownlie & Botha, 2009; Gardner & 
von Hase, 2012; Gibbons & Lindenmayer, 2007; ten Kate, et al., 2004; Zedler, 
1996). For example, the requirement for wetland mitigation in the US state of 
Washington requires that the process reduce the total adverse effect to an 
‘acceptable level’(Johnson, et al., 2002). No net loss if biodiversity is also a 
common goal, followed by the more aspirational version of achieving a net gain in 
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biodiversity (Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme, 2009; McKenney & 
Kiesecker, 2010; New, 2009). The detailed examination of the specifics of all 
these goals is a complex and challenging research area (Gordon, et al., 2011; 
Matthews & Endress, 2008), with some authors contending that aspirations of no 
net loss or net gain are not possible to achieve (Walker, et al., 2009). Whatever 
the eventual goal, the determination of that equivalency is multi-dimensional and 
here three critical and commonly identified aspects: equivalency in time, space 
and type, are discussed. 
2.3.2 Time lags 
Ecological compensation is typically designed to offset an immediate loss, and the 
timing of the delivery of the compensation is important for whether or not this is 
achieved. If equivalence is not achieved at the time of exchange then the time lag 
experienced can have significant ecological implications (Gibbons & 
Lindenmayer, 2007; Maron et al., 2010). Studies have shown that the timing of 
ecological compensation is a critical determinant of success, with temporal 
equivalency outweighing spatial proximity in importance (Gordon, et al., 2011). 
Projects that result in a significant lag between loss and gain are unlikely to be 
successful and are difficult to secure on a legal and practical basis (Maron, et al., 
2010). 
2.3.3 Spatial proximity 
Spatial proximity relates to the physical proximity of the compensatory action to 
the site of ecological harm. There is value in aiming to locate them as close as 
possible to each other for social and ecological reasons (BenDor et al., 2008). 
Many programmes and policies around the world limit the distance or range of 
possible opportunities to compensate for ecological harm on this basis (Gordon, et 
al., 2011). Physical proximity acts to preserve ecological processes and limit the 
degree of difference between sites of the same habitat type (Walker, 2010). The 
importance of spatial proximity as an indicator of a ‘good’ exchange has been 
reduced somewhat in recent years by recognition of the value of aggregating 
mitigation efforts into large projects and the importance of other relevant factors 
in determining appropriate compensation (Gordon, et al., 2011; Kiesecker, et al., 
2009). The practice of compensating at a distant site is becoming increasingly 
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common in the field of ecological compensation (Johnson, et al., 2002; 
McKenney & Kiesecker, 2010). 
2.3.4 Similarity of exchange 
Similarity of exchanges is a success indicator that is commonly present in 
compensation schemes, often referred to as a desire for elements of exchange to 
be ‘like-for-like’ or ‘in-kind’ (BenDor & Riggsbee, 2011). Trading of biodiversity 
components relies on the ability to determine if an exchange is like-for-like, and 
the metrics used to demonstrate this may obscure instances of biodiversity loss 
(Walker, 2010).  Concern that exchanges are between dissimilar components are 
commonly highlighted in the literature, not least because there are few accepted 
methods for comparing loss and gain in this context (Burgin, 2010).  
2.4 Ecological compensation – the lure and the limitations 
Some authors argue that ecological compensation has wide application and 
significant purpose (Gillespie, 2012), while others contend that its capacity to 
contribute positively exists within a narrow band of conditions, if at all (Walker, 
2010). Here the key opportunities promised by ecological compensation are 
discussed, followed by a discussion of common criticisms or disadvantages of the 
concept. 
2.4.1 Opportunities of ecological compensation  
Ecological compensation is a unique opportunity to ensure that development and 
resource use do not persist as zero-sum games. It requires that the overall outcome 
is neutral or positive with respect to natural values, or at the very least a 
significant overall loss does not occur. Many authors have detailed the array of 
benefits and opportunities arising from ecological compensation (e.g. Burgin, 
2008) and we discuss those most salient to a New Zealand context. 
2.4.1.1 Stakeholder benefits 
Ecological compensation has a suite of potential benefits to stakeholders (ten Kate, 
et al., 2004). Developers have access to resources and a licence to operate where 
they agree to deliver positive conservation gains, and the concept has been said to 
enjoy the broad support of industry (Burgin, 2008; Christensen, 2008; ten Kate, et 
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al., 2004). Ecological compensation provides the possibility to build the trust of a 
community, gaining proponents a “licence to operate”. Non-vested conservation 
interests and communities have access to a platform from which to negotiate 
positive conservation outcomes (Burgin, 2008), employing funding from – usually 
the private sector - to contribute to their activities.  
The challenges of conservation are great and the resourcing is typically poor. 
Agencies can exploit gains from ecological compensation to assist in meeting 
wider goals (Burgin, 2008; Walker, 2010) including international treaty 
obligations (e.g. those related to the Convention on Biological Diversity), national 
goals (e.g. the NZ Biodiversity Strategy) and regional and local management 
goals. Providing for compensation also avoids the sometimes awkward decision 
of saying ‘no’ to a proposed development, because a mutually agreeable 
alternative pathway can be negotiated. It steers the discourse away from the 
yes/no binary and toward a platform of collaborative alternative decision-making.  
2.4.1.2 New approaches to environmental management 
It is increasingly acknowledged that the effectiveness of traditional methods of 
environmental management is limited and shrinking (Earl, et al., 2010), and that 
new approaches are needed if the binary of development and ecological protection 
is to be reconciled (Donlan & Wilcox, 2008; Pilgrim, et al., 2013; Reid, 2011). 
Ecological compensation may provide a means by which development and 
resource use contribute less to the loss of ecological capital, providing a formal 
mechanism to demand more effective counterbalancing of impacts and a means to 
raise the profile of environmental values in a development context (Burgin, 2008; 
New, 2009; ten Kate, et al., 2004; Wilding & Raemaekers, 2000). 
2.4.1.3 Strategic conservation gains 
Conservation is a costly exercise and relies on significant fiscal input to generate a 
wide range of indirect outputs that are often not recognised on the basis of their 
economic value (although there is little doubt that conservation outcomes have 
economic value) (Eppink & Bergh, 2007; Secretariat of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, 2010; TEEB – The Economics of Ecosystems and 
Biodiversity for National and International Policy Makers – Summary: 
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Responding to the Value of Nature 2009, 2009). Ecological compensation can 
provide a catalyst to attract funds from the private sector and other resource users 
that were perhaps untapped to date, and undertake strategically important 
conservation projects while providing an opportunity for alliances to be formed 
between the private and public sector, and between conservation agencies and 
developers (Burgin, 2008; Donlan & Wilcox, 2008).  
2.4.2 Growing concerns  
Concerns regarding the uncertainty and risk inherent in compensating for 
ecological harm dominate reviews of its achievements to date, and act to limit 
hopes for its future (BenDor & Riggsbee, 2011; Gordon, et al., 2011; Walker, 
2010).  
2.4.2.1 Complexity of biodiversity 
Several authors discuss the scientific limitations of ecological compensation at 
length, noting that the suggestion that natural values can be traded across time, 
space and even type is incorrect and thus fundamentally challenges the 
workability of the concept (Burgin, 2008; Clare, et al., 2011; Matthews & Endress, 
2008; Salzman & Ruhl, 2000; Walker, 2010; Walker, et al., 2009). Efforts to 
commodify elements of nature are typically underpinned by nascent science and 
untested and often untenable assumptions and methods (Burgin, 2008; Pawliczek 
& Sullivan, 2011; Walker, et al., 2009). It is possible that there will be pressure 
placed on conserving and managing the easily identifiable components of 
ecological systems, while more cryptic, complex, process-oriented or obscure 
elements disappear unnoticed (Burgin, 2008; Eppink & Bergh, 2007).  
2.4.2.2 Follow-up and failure 
A failure to attribute sufficient priority and resource to following up on 
agreements for ecological compensation has curtailed and will continue to curtail 
positive outcomes, as it does more widely in environmental management (Burgin, 
2008; Clare, et al., 2011; Hornyak & Halvorsen, 2003; Johnson, et al., 2002; 
Matthews & Endress, 2008; Quetier & Lavorel, 2011; Race & Fonseca, 1996; 
Reiss et al., 2009; Walker, 2010). Several reviews have been undertaken of 
ecological compensation in practice, generally demonstrating low rates of 
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compliance and significant implementation issues due to poor management of 
regulatory risk (BenDor & Riggsbee, 2011; Gardner, 2009; Hallwood, 2007; 
Hornyak & Halvorsen, 2003; Wagner et al., 1997).  
A failure to sufficiently enforce these requirements also undermines the entire 
system of resource management and results in the resources expended at the front 
(planning stages) of the process having been essentially wasted (Burgin, 2008; 
Gibbons & Lindenmayer, 2007; Keane et al., 2008). This cycle self-perpetuates 
when the likelihood of monitoring or enforcement – or the penalties likely to 
eventuate – are low. Research demonstrates that proponents will make a financial 
decision to not undertake the works, further marring the possibility of a good 
outcome (Dong, 2007; Hornyak & Halvorsen, 2003; Johnson, et al., 2002; Keane, 
et al., 2008). Some ecological compensation is also not achieved due to 
insufficient consideration of sources of uncertainty in negotiating the 
requirements, such as the capacity of current scientific knowledge to carry out the 
works (Maron, et al., 2012; Matthews & Endress, 2008; Mitsch & Wilson, 1996; 
Moilanen et al., 2008).  
2.4.2.3 Delays and adversity in the project planning process 
The anticipation of ecological compensation – while presenting an opportunity for 
flexibility – is often a source of significant tension and delay in the process toward 
obtaining consent. Applicants express annoyance at matters such as the 
inconsistency encountered in the process, the delays that result from additional 
assessment costs and the cost of the compensation itself (Christensen, 2008; Greer 
& Som, 2010).  
2.4.2.4 Symbolic policy that facilitates inappropriate development 
Ecological compensation in its many forms is regarded by some authors as a 
symbolic concept that, while attractive in principle for the reasons above, does not 
result in the promised benefits and serves to do little but facilitate inappropriate 
development and ‘pacify’ those that aim to protect the environment, and that 
perhaps that failure will not be avoided through improvement in practice (Walker, 
2010; Walker, et al., 2009). The widespread and detailed analysis of the 
fundamental shortcomings of ecological compensation obviously calls into 
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question the notion of compensating for ecological harm at all, and casts 
significant doubt on the likely outcomes of legislative sanctioning of the approach 
(Burgin, 2008). Despite widespread criticism of the validity of the concept, and 
significant caveats upon its use, most commentators however conclude by stating 
tentative support for the concept notwithstanding the implementation concerns 
(e.g. Gibbons & Lindenmayer, 2007; Race & Fonseca, 1996). The regulatory 
appeal of the concept however, is something of a warning bell, signalling that 
agency administration of the concept is unlikely to place ecological concerns at 
the forefront of decision-making. 
2.5 Ecological compensation – the New Zealand experience 
New Zealand has been implementing variations on ecological compensation for 
decades, with one of the first iterations being tradable development rights in 
subdivision. Dominant in the history of implementation is a lack of explicit 
treatment in law and policy, which has created uncertainty and confusion (Memon 
& Skelton, 2004; Turner, 2000). New Zealand continues to implement ecological 
compensation on an ad hoc and piecemeal basis. In 2000, Salzman and Ruhl 
identified that project by project compensatory mitigation has ‘failed miserably’ 
in the United States to achieve the purported goal of environmental protection 
because – among other issues - it made monitoring and enforcement of 
requirements difficult. It is likely therefore, based on international experience that 
the informal implementation of ecological compensation in New Zealand, will 
suffer the same shortcomings. 
2.5.1 New Zealand biodiversity 
New Zealand is an isolated archipelago, one third of which is managed within the 
Crown conservation estate: just over 8.4 million ha in area of a total protected 
area for nature conservation purposes of 8.7 million ha (Ministry for the 
Environment, 2010). Human habitation has for less than 1000 years been causing 
significant ecological change, resulting in severe rates of loss of indigenous cover 
which continues today (Frances & Warren, 1999; Green & Clarkson, 2005; 
Walker et al., 2008; Walker et al., 2006). Habitat clearance is the most pressing 
threat to indigenous biodiversity, followed closely (and in some cases surpassed) 
by the threats posed by pest plants and animals (Parliamentary Commissioner for 
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the Environment, 2011; Walker, et al., 2008). Many species of plants and animals 
that persist today are threatened or data is insufficient to determine their status. 
The land area that is enclosed within the conservation estate is not representative 
of the full range of ecosystems, being heavily biased towards upland habitat types 
(Norton & Overmars, 2012).  
Among the indigenous biota, there is a globally high rate of endemism (Ministry 
for the Environment, 2010). An evolutionary history largely devoid of land 
mammals (with the exception of terrestrial bats) has resulted in various unique 
ecological features including a preponderance of ground-nesting birds. While 
these curious creatures result in high rates of endemism and a unique and 
appealing biota, the flipside is that New Zealand fauna is extremely vulnerable to 
the impacts of exotic predators. Our native flora is also subject to significant 
mammalian browse by introduced fauna, and displacement and out-competition 
by naturalised and invasive plant arrivals. The high degree of endemism gives 
New Zealand a global responsibility to protect its unique suite of species 
(Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, 2011) much of which is now 
confined to offshore islands and dependent upon high levels of human 
intervention to ensure its survival (Towns et al., 2007). 
2.5.2 The legal context of compensating for ecological harm in New Zealand 
New Zealand is a signatory to the Convention on Biological Diversity, and has in 
place (in response) the New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy which contains 
national-level goals for the conservation of indigenous biodiversity (Walker, et al., 
2008). New Zealand’s two main pieces of environmental legislation are the 
Conservation Act 1987 (hereafter CA), applying to the Crown conservation estate, 
and the Resource Management Act 1991 (hereafter RMA) which has much wider 
jurisdiction. Other legislation has a role to play in relation to specific matters, 
such as the Wildlife Act 1957, the Biosecurity Act 1993 and others. As in most 
jurisdictions, the permitting regime for ecologically damaging activities is a key 
area of focus for environmental agencies (Wood, 2010), and ecological 
compensation in New Zealand can form part of permissions granted for activities 
under both the Conservation Act and the Resource Management Act (Madsen, et 
al., 2010; Turner, 2000).  
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The Conservation Act 1987 is administered by a single agency, the Department of 
Conservation, and operates somewhat independently of RMA-based controls 
(Salmon et al., 2005). The Act controls the use of the Crown-owned conservation 
estate which occupies more than one third of New Zealand’s land area. Ecological 
compensation is not explicitly provided for by the Conservation Act; however the 
Department of Conservation has, for the past three years (2010-2012), been 
developing guidance material in relation to biodiversity offsets specifically as the 
leaders of a Cross-Departmental Research Fund investigation (Department of 
Conservation, 2010).  
Most ecological compensation in New Zealand that is required in a statutory 
context occurs under the RMA. The Resource Management Act is implemented, 
in contrast to the Conservation Act, in a decentralised system comprising central, 
regional and local government agencies carrying out a range of functions, often 
identified explicitly within the Act (Gleeson & Grundy, 1997; RMA 1991; 
Salmon, et al., 2005). The RMA does not specifically address the concept, with 
the most explicit reference being embodied in the broad principle that adverse 
effects on the environment are to be ‘avoided, remedied or mitigated’, with 
ecological compensation having been deemed to fit within ‘mitigation’ for the 
purpose of the Act. Some Regional Plans and Policy Statements make more 
specific reference to the concept, as do some District Plans, while some council 
agencies employ internal practice notes to guide consideration of proposals that 
include offers of ecological compensation (e.g. Waikato Regional Council).  
Inherent to the RMA is the concept of trade-offs between various societal goals 
including environmental protection, health and safety, economic development and 
cultural heritage, among others, referred to by Gleeson & Grundy (1997) as an 
‘uneasy balance’. In the case of ecological compensation, applicants proposing a 
project with significant adverse effects are entitled to offer up forms of 
compensation to the agency to counterbalance their impacts, which the receiving 
agency can consider under section 104 of the Act. Section 104 states what a 
decision-maker must have regard to for the purposes of the Act (RMA, 1991). In 
this way, the practice of ecological compensation relies upon control of activities 
such that a need to seek permission is generated (Walker, 2010).  
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The requirements for ecological compensation are typically secured via resource 
consent conditions. In some situations, ecological compensation (along with other 
forms of compensation) may be stated within a ‘side agreement’ between the 
proponent and a third party (Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, 
1998). While this can occur, such matters were not a focus of the present research 
as access to information can be problematic as many such agreements are 
confidential. 
Consent conditions under the Resource Management Act 1991 must adhere to 
three principles, called the Newbury Principles: 
 The condition must be for a resource management purpose 
 Conditions must relate to the authorised development 
 Conditions must be reasonable  
(Ministry for the Environment, 2001). 
The Newbury Principles were determined in 1981 in Newbury District Council v 
Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] AC 578 by the English House of 
Lords. They were formally discussed under the RMA in Housing NZ Ltd v 
Waitakere City Council [2001] NZRMA 202 (CA) and the Court of Appeal 
determined that they were to be generally applied when considering the scope and 
purpose of consent conditions under Section 108 of the RMA (Nolan, 2005, 
NZRMA, 2001).   
In New Zealand, follow-up is regulator-driven, although many individual consents 
require self-monitoring by the proponent (Tonkin & Taylor, 2012). The issuing 
agency has a statutory duty to monitor whether the consent conditions have been 
achieved, and to undertake enforcement as appropriate in the event that 
compliance is not achieved, in addition to a range of wider environmental 
reporting responsibilities (RMA, 1991). The Ministry for the Environment also 
has a statutory duty under Section 31 of the Environment Act 1986 and Section 24 
of the RMA to provide advice and undertake various forms of monitoring and 
investigation related to matters of environmental management (Nolan, 2005). As 
in other jurisdictions, in New Zealand there is concern at the lack of monitoring 
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and follow-up in environmental management, despite significant provision in law 
for these to be undertaken (e.g. Laurian et al., 2010).  
Breaches under the RMA include failing to obtain required permission, failing to 
comply with conditions of permission, or other offences such as failing to comply 
with general duties laid down in the Act. The potential penalties under Section 
338 of the Act are significant if prosecution is pursued, with a maximum fine of 
$600,000 and a potential imprisonment term of up to two years. Besides 
prosecution, there is a range of enforcement tools under the RMA including 
infringement fines, abatement notices and enforcement orders (Nolan, 2005). 
2.6 Evaluating compensation in a policy vacuum  
The effectiveness of environmental regulation, policy and management is 
dependent upon the quality of implementation and outcomes, which are rarely 
systematically reviewed (Bennear & Coglianese, 2004; Gardner, 2009; Laurian, et 
al., 2010). A lack of post-implementation evaluation may be due to a lack of time, 
commitment or expertise, or a general reluctance to reveal inefficiencies or 
failures (Laurian, et al., 2010). Follow-up of environmental provisions is critical 
to closing the policy loop, and providing sufficient feedback to improve 
approaches and enhance outcomes. This gap in analysis is serious, particularly 
with respect to certain phenomena such as the management of cumulative effects 
that may only be understood through systematic assessment (Morrison-Saunders, 
et al., 2001). 
Several authors have discussed the use of ecological compensation in New 
Zealand, (Christensen, 2007, 2008; Memon & Skelton, 2004; Norton, 2007, 2008), 
but an empirical and systematic analysis has been missing to date. In undertaking 
this research, a conscious choice was made to maintain a focus that was able to 
provide an objective analysis of current use and to provide recommendations on 
future implementation of ecological compensation.  
The evaluation of the use to date of ecological compensation in New Zealand has 
been very limited. Much of the analysis of the concept, and the genuine attempts 
to formulate parameters for it have been confined to the consideration of specific 
instances within case law (Christensen, 2007, 2008, 2012; Gillespie, 2012; 
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Memon & Skelton, 2004; Norton, 2007; Stephens, 2010). Several regional 
councils and some district councils have also introduced ecological compensation 
into their planning and policy documents during plan review processes (e.g. 
Horizons Regional Council, Environment Canterbury and Auckland Council), and 
this trend is likely to continue as the appetite for certainty drives a proliferation of 
lower level policy. This proliferation may continue to create variable outcomes, 
and a lack of national guidance may result in significant variation in outcomes 
that then become the subject of lengthy review processes, particularly where 
provisions depart from best practice or are likely to generate perverse outcomes. A 
systematic evidence basis from which policy development and implementation 
guidance can be developed is long overdue. 
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Chapter 3 
Methods 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Research proposal 
An empirical approach defines this research, as it aims to address and quantify a 
gap in knowledge of how ecological compensation is being practised in New 
Zealand under the RMA. The research aimed to establish a baseline understanding 
of implementation in New Zealand to date, with the proposed outcome to be a 
series of recommendations as to how better to address the concept in policy, 
practice and follow-up. It was also likely that, as a foundation project, the research 
would reveal areas of future inquiry that would further assist in improving 
outcomes. 
 It was possible to conduct this study in relation to both the Conservation Act 
1987 and the Resource Management Act 1991. But given the degree of 
development on private land in New Zealand, it was assumed that the bulk of 
exchanges were undertaken within the RMA regime, rather than the Conservation 
Act 1987. In addition, initial inquiries revealed that the information was easier to 
access with respect to resource consents than access arrangements and 
concessions. Determining that the focus would be upon ecological compensation 
agreements within resource consents under the RMA led to the development of 
the key research question: 
What outcomes are associated with ecological compensation agreements under the 
Resource Management Act 1991 and how might the variation among outcomes be 
explained? 
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Most of the reviews of ecological compensation around the world had focused on 
one of three topics: compliance, practice and stakeholder perspectives. Authors 
have investigated levels of regulatory compliance with ecological compensation 
requirements (Hornyak & Halvorsen, 2003; Matthews & Endress, 2008), 
researched the ways in which the concept is applied in practice (Cowell, 2000; 
Rega, 2013) and, finally, taken time to collect the views of stakeholders involved 
in ecological compensation (Hayes & Morrison-Saunders, 2007). All three topics 
were of interest and we undertook to carry out a study addressing each on a 
national scale in New Zealand under the RMA. 
3.2 The research process 
Ecological compensation is not a phenomenon typically subject to rigorous review. 
The concept is technically complex, and the context in which it is employed is 
multi-dimensional. Designing a research programme to effectively describe the 
implementation of ecological compensation relied on finding a way to investigate 
more than one aspect of the implementation, and a pure quantitative or qualitative 
approach was likely to be inadequate. As such, I opted to use a ‘mixed methods 
approach’ (Tashakkori, 2009). Mixed methods is defined as a research process “in 
which the investigator collects and analyzes data, integrates the findings, and 
draws inferences using both qualitative and quantitative approaches or methods 
in a single study or a program of inquiry’’ (Tashakkori & Creswell, 2007, p. 4). 
The present research is evaluative, and the use of mixed methods approaches 
enjoys particular support for such applications (Bryman, 2006).  
Mixed methods draws on the strengths of both qualitative and quantitative tools, 
acts to offset some of the weaknesses of each by combining it with the other, 
contending that neither on its own is adequate (Bryman, 2006). It also enables the 
two very different forms of inquiry to be used together to best effect, arguably 
enriching the research findings and having greater explanatory power (Fielding, 
2012). The use of a mixed methods approach must have a purpose, and in this 
example the chief purpose is triangulation around a complex research area 
(Bryman, 2006, Cresswell, 2003).  
The use of multiple approaches found within mixed methods research was 
described by Fielding (2012) as having three key purposes (illustration, 
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convergent validation/triangulation and analytic density). All three purposes are 
relevant to this study, but of them triangulation is the most pertinent. 
Triangulation provides for the same phenomena to be examined from multiple 
angles, with each angle augmenting the rigour of the others and providing overall 
greater validity to the research findings. Given the lack of contextual 
understanding of ecological compensation in New Zealand that was available to 
inform the research approach, mixed methods ensured a range of data was 
collected to build a multi-faceted view of the concept and issues. 
The present research began with an investigation of regulatory compliance with 
ecological compensation, a project that used a quantitative approach and drew on 
a number of similar studies worldwide as already discussed. The mixed methods 
approach formed somewhat organically due to a growing realisation that the 
complexity of the context would likely render numerical analysis somewhat 
shallow, and that a combination of approaches would have greater explanatory 
power.  
The quantitative assessment of regulatory compliance drew upon practitioner 
experience in compliance assessment and yielded interesting data. In examining 
this data and the concurrent literature reviews, it became clear that not only was it 
important that compliance was achieved, but that the requirements of the resource 
consents were robust. As discussed in the Introduction, there is no formal policy 
framework for ecological compensation in New Zealand that contains ‘clues’ as to 
the expectations of agencies and the wider public as they relate to ecological 
compensation. Once a decision was made to delve deeper into analysing the case 
studies, it was necessary to determine an appropriate means of assessment, in the 
absence of a widely used framework. A framework would provide a consistency 
and transparency to the analysis of implementation, would be useful in limiting 
observer bias and avoiding unfair assessments of practice. 
In the year the research was being planned (2010), McKenney & Kiesecker 
published ‘Policy Development for Biodiversity Offsets’, an analysis of a wide 
range of offset frameworks worldwide. The authors identified a suite of six key 
implementation issues from the schema and distilled both a definition of each 
issue and demonstrated its assessment in practice. Another possible alternative 
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was the recently developed principles from the Business and Biodiversity Offsets 
Programme (BBOP).  BBOP principles were developed in a voluntary context, 
assuming minimal regulation and very low agency capacity. McKenney & 
Kiesecker by contrast were developed to characterise a range of contexts, with 
different levels of agency capacity and regulatory specificity that, ultimately, had 
greater utility for the assessment task. The flexibility of the McKenney and 
Kiesecker framework, along with the clarity of the concepts and ease of 
application to a New Zealand context saw it adopted for the purposes of this 
research. 
Early in the research, a means of gathering views of practitioners was considered, 
and the original proposal included conducting a limited-recipient survey, likely 
web-based for ease of communication and analysis. As stated earlier, a growing 
appreciation for the value of qualitative approaches and discussions with social 
scientists cast doubt on the ability of web-based surveys to be of help. On 
recommendation of an expert practitioner, an interview approach was selected in 
lieu of a web-based survey. The interview would be based on a series of questions 
developed in association with practitioners and designed to understand the 
interviewee’s views on the current implementation of ecological compensation, 
and how it may be improved.  
A semi-structured interview approach allows for an interview to proceed as a 
conversation would, but to do so via a series of talking point questions of 
significance. Semi-structured interviews are an optimal method for collecting 
detailed information on a complex concept, providing for both closed-response 
questions and open responses (Kaplowitz, 2008). Interviews would be conducted 
over the phone in most cases, but in person where time and spatial proximity 
allowed. 
3.2.1 Case studies 
To carry out an investigation of both levels of regulatory compliance and practice 
under the RMA a case study approach was used, of consents that required 
ecological compensation under the RMA (Crowe et al., 2011; Gillham, 2000). 
The present research aimed to collect a minimum of 40 case studies from around 
the country to ensure that a large degree of variation was captured, including 
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where appropriate, salient cases of interest and high public profile. It is optimal 
for statistical purposes that a suite of case studies may be considered to be 
representative and random. Unfortunately, New Zealand does not have a standard 
recording system for resource consents, with each local government agency 
managing its own database independently. Further, whether or not ecological 
compensation is required within the consent is rarely recorded in a way that would 
enable appropriate consents to be separated out from the rest of them. As such, 
random selection was not possible, so other strategies were employed to help 
enhance representativeness in the sample set. 
All regional councils were approached around the country (to ensure geographic 
spread of examples, and a nationwide dataset) to provide examples of cases they 
were aware of. Several district councils were also invited, and a number of high 
profile cases were added, that illustrated particular pertinent aspects. Information 
was subsequently collected on 110 suitable case studies in total. The information 
included ecological reports, submitters’ information, officers’ reports on behalf of 
the council and other material such as approved plans. Other cases were also 
offered but excluded because they did not meet the criteria (see Table 1 of 
Chapter 4). Most commonly a case was excluded because ecological 
compensation was not required as a specific condition of the resource consent. 
This scenario was surprisingly common, in which the officer providing the case 
studies had been aware of ecological compensation being discussed, but the 
condition requiring it not being specified in the consent. These cases were 
excluded, but did illustrate that the connection between ecologists and other 
specialists in council with the consent-writing planning officers were often loose, 
and that poor communication could act to constrain outcomes (i.e. if a condition is 
not in the consent requiring something, failure to undertake it cannot be met with 
appropriate follow-up and enforcement action). Each consent case study was then 
subject to a systematic evaluation that is detailed across a number of forms, 
designed to standardise the information collection process (Appendix 1-5).  
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Figure 1: Map of New Zealand showing location of 110 case studies 
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3.2.2 Compliance 
The formulation of ecological compensation agreements is the first step in a 
process that may be intended to take decades or even centuries. Assumptions of 
perfect compliance (i.e. that rules and requirements will be adhered to) is 
pervasive in natural resource management, but rarely supported by fact, and 
taking for granted that rules and restrictions are followed will result in negative 
outcomes for the environment (Keane, et al., 2008). The lack of follow-up and 
monitoring of compensatory actions is an oft-cited shortcoming of ecological 
compensation (Gibbons & Lindenmayer, 2007; Hornyak & Halvorsen, 2003; ten 
Kate, et al., 2004; Walker, et al., 2009), with Gibbons and Lindenmayer (2007) 
contending that the success of such mechanisms is ‘ultimately dependent upon 
adequate compliance’.  
The research aim was to discern the level of regulatory compliance with 
ecological compensation in New Zealand, to compare it with the levels observed 
elsewhere in the world. Studies around the world have typically evaluated 
compliance with requirements to provide a picture of the reliability of agreements 
and to reflect the rigour and efficacy of the related enforcement. For example, a 
factor that is thought to have an impact on whether a consent holder complies with 
the terms of their permission is perceived likelihood of enforcement (Hornyak & 
Halvorsen, 2003). 
The international literature also suggests that a deeper understanding of the 
reasons behind non-compliance is likely to be more helpful than simple 
percentage rates of satisfactory action (Clare, et al., 2011; Keane, et al., 2008). To 
more deeply investigate compliance, it was decided to examine variables related 
to each consent, for their correlation with compliance to assist in providing a 
deeper understanding of how outcomes might be improved. Variables in the 
planning process include the nature of the applicant, the type of activity and the 
way in which the requirements are specified through to whether a proposal is 
notified for public comment.  
Compliance can be a difficult area to investigate as access to sites and information 
can be problematic (Keane, et al., 2008). In addition, an absence of clear 
performance standards can make compliance difficult to determine as 
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requirements are unclear (Environmental Law Institute, 2004). However, despite 
the challenges, understanding the nature and extent of non-compliance is the first 
step in meaningfully addressing implementation issues related to compliance and 
to enhance the overall effectiveness of natural resource management. 
Key question 1  
What are the levels of compliance with ecological compensation requirements in 
consents under the Resource Management Act 1991, and how might variation in 
compliance levels be explained? 
Addressing this question demanded an ex post facto analysis of outcomes already 
achieved, comparing them with the outcomes intended via regulation. To achieve 
this, reliable measures of outcomes were needed (Bennear & Coglianese, 2004). 
Determination of success or failure is reliant upon having goals established in the 
first place, either policy-based or on a project basis (Matthews & Endress, 2008). 
The ‘goals’ of the case studies were the conditions of the resource consent issued 
in respect of the project that explicitly related to ecological compensation. 
The conditions of resource consent were the most reliable manifestation of the 
goals of each individual project as they are project specific and enforceable. 
Conditions may compel actions, set timelines or otherwise outline performance 
standards. Compliance was assessed independently of the issuing agency due to 
variability in agency record-keeping, the age of the consents, and the advantage of 
greater objectivity (as in Johnson, et al., 2002). Some studies have undertaken the 
assessment of compliance without visiting the site in question and/or the location 
of the compensation activity (Hornyak & Halvorsen, 2003). The present research 
included a site visit to help the researcher understand the context of the activity 
should be undertaken whenever possible. Compliance was assessed between 1 
October 2010 and 28 February 2011, either visually on-site or by reviewing 
agency records and discussing the case with key informants, or a combination of 
the two approaches.  
While further detail is provided in Chapter 4 on the research process, it is essential 
to explain the use of the compliance scale (see Table 2 in Chapter 4). The 
compliance scale was used to analyse and describe the degree of compliance that 
46 
 
an applicant had achieved with each condition. The scale had four categories, 
where 0 reflected that no effort had been made to achieve compliance, through 
categories 1 and 2 which were lesser degrees of non-compliance and the final 
category of 3 that denoted compliance with requirements. Scales describing extent 
of non-compliance with a requirement are in common usage around the country 
and the world, and provide a more meaningful reflection of legality than a mere 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ binary. Importantly, only conditions which are fully complied were 
considered compliant, with the other categories representing different degrees of 
non-compliance. 
3.2.3 Practice 
The importance of compliance is negated where the requirements to be completed 
fall well short of achieving equivalency in terms of loss and gain. For this reason, 
compliance with regulatory requirements is not necessarily a reliable indicator of 
ecological outcomes generated by a project (Matthews & Endress, 2008; Race & 
Fonseca, 1996). The research aim of this section was to evaluate how key matters 
related to ecological compensation were considered in practice (i.e. during the 
processing of a resource consent), and what the nature was of ecological 
compensation agreements that are negotiated under the RMA. This would enable 
the quality of the exchanges to be better understood, while determining how 
widely-discussed concepts such as ‘additionality’ might be assessed in a New 
Zealand context. 
Key question 2 
How is ecological compensation considered in practice by agencies under the 
RMA, with respect to key implementation issues? 
Little guidance is available to practitioners in New Zealand on what matters they 
must have regard to in respect of ecological compensation. The use of ecological 
compensation is also not considered in national monitoring programmes, limiting 
the possibility to improve implementation through feedback loops. In the absence 
of specified guidance, policy or goals the framework proposed by McKenney and 
Kiesecker (2010) was used to drive the assessment, due to its broad applicability. 
The key implementation issues identified by McKenney & Kiesecker provided a 
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framework to consider the exchanges that were encountered and to determine the 
way the issues are recognised in the present ad hoc regime for ecological 
compensation. McKenney and Kiesecker also discussed related issues such as the 
mitigation hierarchy, the goal of no net loss and the implications for landscape 
level planning. The present analysis includes discussion of these matters also. 
3.2.4 Stakeholder perspectives 
In the absence of significant guiding policy and decision support for ecological 
compensation in New Zealand, the ability to evaluate the implementation of 
ecological compensation is constrained. New Zealand has had significant 
experience with compensatory mechanisms which, to date, had not been collected 
in a manner that was systematic and able to contribute to a policy context. The 
present research therefore proposed to use interview methodologies to collect the 
views of practitioners involved in the concept on the nature of the strengths and 
weakness of the approach and how it may best be addressed in future.  
This element of the research was deemed necessary in light of several studies 
around the world which note the value of engaging with practitioners via 
interviews or questionnaires when attempting to understand the implementation of 
ecological compensation and other environmental issues and events (Carruthers & 
Neis, 2011; Clare, et al., 2011; Hayes & Morrison-Saunders, 2007; Murphy, 2006; 
Salzman & Ruhl, 2010-2011; Seabrook-Davison et al., 2010; ten Kate, et al., 
2004). A programme of interviews would reflect broad opinions and experience 
from practitioners in New Zealand, enabling comparison both between New 
Zealand and the rest of the world as well as the ability to consider the breadth of 
views between individuals and sectors. 
Key question 3  
What are the perspectives of stakeholders on the implementation of ecological 
compensation under the RMA and possible improvements that are required? 
Interviews have commonly been used to discern the practices and perspectives of 
end-users in environmental management and were considered likely to provide a 
valuable dimension to our investigation as they had for similar studies worldwide 
(Carruthers & Neis, 2011; Hayes & Morrison-Saunders, 2007; Kaplowitz et al., 
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2008; Seabrook-Davison, et al., 2010). A combination of self-selection and a key 
informant approach was used for the semi-structured interviews (Kaplowitz, et al., 
2008; Tremblay, 1957). As discussed earlier, semi-structured interviews enabled a 
deeper engagement with the subject matter and interviewee than other possible 
methods (i.e. web-based survey). 
In situations where analysis methods are not envisioned or planned for, the 
usefulness of interview data can be constrained (see discussion of interview data 
outcomes in Johnson, et al., 2002). Thematic and content analysis techniques 
were used to analyse to open-ended questions, coding the frequency of types of 
responses to understand dominant views and divergence across sectors. 
Conversion of the coding into percentages enabled these to be expressed 
numerically for ease of communication of results. Several papers on ecological 
compensation and biodiversity management more generally discuss actual or 
suspected divergence in views and aims across different groups such as 
developers, agencies and non-vested conservation interests (Burgin, 2008; ten 
Kate, et al., 2004; Walker, et al., 2009; Walker, et al., 2008). In response, the aim 
was to ascertain whether significant differences were present in the dataset. The 
chi-squared test was used to test for significant differences in categorical 
responses, and otherwise employed simple data presentation methods such as 
frequency tables (Agresti, 1996; Braun & Clarke, 2006; Kaplowitz, et al., 2008). 
Given the highly applied nature of the research, and the need to eventually clearly 
communicate the results to end-users, the research approach intentionally 
favoured simple analysis and data presentation.  
3.3 Assumptions and Limitations 
The present research into ecological compensation was made challenging by the 
lack of prior empirical inquiry in New Zealand, a lack of explicit treatment of the 
concept in law and policy and a poor understanding of the extent to which the 
concept is applied within New Zealand. In restricting cases to those consents 
issued under the Resource Management Act 1991, some of the ambiguity in 
practice was addressed. While not explicit in stating expectations of ecological 
compensation, the RMA does contain a suite of standardised processes that 
underpin the use of the tool (for example, it contains requirements for 
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Assessments of Environmental Effects, the RMA equivalent of an Environmental 
Impact Assessment).  
A formal definition of ecological compensation was also (and remains) missing 
from New Zealand law and policy, with discussions in jurisprudence and practice 
often focussing on the perceived distinctions between ‘mitigation’, ‘offsetting’, 
‘compensation’ and other terms found within the field (including most recently in  
High Court hearing over the approval of the Escarpment Mine on the Denniston 
Plateau). A general definition was formulated (later accepted into the published 
literature) and used that to define ecological compensation throughout the 
research process. The definition of ecological compensation for the purpose of the 
present research therefore, is: 
“Positive conservation actions required by resource consent, and intended 
to compensate for residual adverse effects of development and resource 
use” 
An important assumption made, was that the implementation issues were likely to 
be the same for any requirement that met the above definition. This assumption 
was made on the basis of practitioner experience, and is likely a fair one, but it is 
important that it is stated. 
A major limitation of the study was the inability to sample a random selection of 
case studies or interviewees, due to the specialist nature of the inquiry (i.e. only 
certain individuals were likely to have experience working with ecological 
compensation). To that end, it is accepted that the views and results pertaining to 
compliance may not constitute a statistically representative picture of practice as it 
stands. However, to address this obvious contextual constraint, a number of 
methods were employed, such as: 
 Undertaking analysis of large samples of data, rather than a small number 
to improve the likelihood that variability would be captured. 
 Using a range of communication methods to invite participants and case 
study contributions, to improve the diversity of data sources. 
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 Undertaking the study on a nationwide basis, and approaching a wide 
range of geographically distinct areas to gather regional experience of 
ecological compensation 
Undertaking the compliance assessment required access to a large number of 
documents and access to the land or area in which the ecological compensation 
was carried out. This was because earlier considerations discounted using agency 
records to determine compliance due to their variability and incompleteness, and 
inconsistency in record-keeping across jurisdictions. A key limitation of the 
research therefore, was the ability to fairly assess compliance based on the 
information available, and whether or not access to land (usually private) could be 
obtained. If some of the compliance levels were determined second-hand via 
agency records, then the results may not be comparable enough to fairly aggregate 
them with researcher-led analysis. Therefore, assuming that access to records and 
land could be obtained, the research proceeded on the notion that the same 
analysis would be applied to all case studies irrespective and independent of the 
quality of monitoring data associated with them. 
In respect of both the case studies and interviews, a major assumption was that 
there would be agencies, landowners and participants of suitable background 
willing to be involved. Low response rates would constrain any ability to provide 
analysis of practice and outcomes that could be generalised. The cost constraints 
also demanded that most of the interviews were conducted over the phone. 
Interviews over the phone may constrain communication opportunities and limit 
the depth of discussion, when compared with in-person communication. 
A key assumption (typical of applied research) was that the outcomes would be 
relevant and useful to stakeholders. Approaching the research from a practitioner 
background was likely a strength in respect of this classic limitation. Constant 
engagement with end users and making an effort to remain in tune with 
developments in the field (both academic literature and professional practice) was 
an important dimension of improving applicability of results.  
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Chapter 4 
Ecological compensation: an evaluation 
of regulatory compliance in New 
Zealand1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Abstract 
Ecological compensation is an example of a trade-off whereby loss of natural 
values is remedied or offset by a corresponding compensatory action on the same 
site or elsewhere, determined through the process of Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA). Ecological compensation actions are often criticized for 
having low levels of compliance: meaning that they are achieved only partially or 
not at all, while development activity proceeds with much greater certainty. Our 
research investigated compliance with 245 conditions relating to ecological 
                                                 
1 Published as “Ecological compensation: an evaluation of regulatory compliance in New Zealand” in Impact 
Assessment and Project Appraisal Vol 31 pp34-44 by M A Brown, B D Clarkson, B J Barton and C Joshi. 
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compensation across 81 case studies across New Zealand under the Resource 
Management Act 1991. 
Our research shows that present tools and practice in New Zealand are not 
adequately securing the necessary benefits from ecological compensation 
requirements, with 35.2% of requirements not being achieved. Significant 
variation in non-compliance with ecological compensation occurs between 
different activities, applicant types and condition types, while critical variables 
within the planning process influence levels of compliance. Our research 
demonstrates the importance of understanding the nature of non-compliance and 
of providing a consistent and robust decision-making framework for the 
consideration of ecological compensation in practice.  
4.2 Introduction 
Ecological compensation is a positive conservation action that is required to 
counter-balance ecological values lost in the context of development or resource 
use, and is an intentional form of trade (Morrison-Saunders & Pope 2013). Trade-
offs are determined through Environmental Impact assessment (EIA) which 
provides a framework for decision-making in relation to projects with adverse 
environmental effects. EIA enables the effects of a proposal to be predicted and 
for the development and agreement of appropriate ways in which to mitigate them 
(Bailey & Hobbs 1990; Bailey et al. 1992; Marshall 2001).  
Evaluation of the use of ecological compensation internationally has found 
common themes of poor administration, failures of implementation, low scientific 
capability to deliver required outcomes, high risk of non-compliance and a lack of 
enforcement; reducing the effectiveness of policies and practice designed to 
safeguard ecological values (Gardner 2009; Gibbons & Lindenmayer 2007; 
Gillespie 2012; Hornyak & Halvorsen 2003; Maron et al. 2012; Race & Fonseca 
1996; Walker et al. 2009).  This research paper focuses on the nature of non-
compliance as it relates to ecological compensation. Of concern is that if 
compensation requirements do not materialise as agreed, then allowing those 
trade-offs does little but facilitate negative impacts on the environment (Bekessy 
et al. 2010). They also serve to undermine the credibility of impact assessment 
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processes and environmental regulations if the outcomes realised regularly fall far 
short of expectations (Hornyak & Halvorsen 2003). 
In New Zealand, the principal legislation that relates to ecological compensation 
is the Resource Management Act 1991 (the “RMA”), which sets out impact 
assessment (termed an ‘Assessment of Environmental Effects’ or AEE, outlined 
in Schedule 4 of the Act) within a sustainable management regime that mandates 
the avoidance, remediation or mitigation of adverse effects (Jackson & Dixon 
2006; Morgan 2012; Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA)  1991). Other than 
this broad mandate to address effects, there is presently no nationally agreed 
policy, guidance or legislation that articulates the concept of compensating for 
ecological harm through trade-offs, or that sets overall outcomes to be achieved 
(Department of Conservation 2010; Gillespie 2012; Madsen et al. 2010; Memon 
& Skelton 2004; Turner 2000). For example, Borrie et al (2004) argued that 
practice in New Zealand was lacking in comparison to other jurisdictions due to 
policy ambivalence, implementation and enforcement issues and the lack of 
sufficient security measures available to ensure gains are realised and protected, 
noting:  
“we are profoundly concerned about this situation because it is already 
leading to the cumulative loss of New Zealand’s valued biophysical 
environments”. 
(Memon et al. 2004 p.85) 
Assuming that ecological compensation in some form or another is likely to 
persist as a policy tool, it is vital to improve the levels of compliance with 
compensation conditions and to better understand the nature of non-compliance, 
such that improvements can be made to the pre-decision stages of environmental 
impact assessment to reduce risk of default (Marshall et al. 2005). This research 
focussed on examining the levels of regulatory compliance with ecological 
compensation requirements in resource consents. We investigated what factors 
contributed to variation in those levels through a post-project implementation 
audit, based on 81 case studies, assessing compliance with 245 conditions that 
specifically related to ecological compensation.  
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4.2.1 Definition 
A broad definition of ecological compensation for the purposes of this research 
was favoured in order to capture the range of current practice in New Zealand. 
Existing definitions were not appropriate, because they referred to matters that are 
not legally required in New Zealand including observation of the mitigation 
hierarchy and a goal of no net loss of biodiversity.  The mitigation hierarchy 
places preference on avoidance of adverse effects, followed by minimisation of 
them and then, if required, the mitigation or offsetting of residual effects 
(McKenney & Kiesecker 2010). The observance of a mitigation hierarchy often 
occurs in practice in New Zealand (and indeed, is inherent within environmental 
impact assessment generally), but there is no statutory requirement or national 
level policy that requires that adherence to it be demonstrated. No net loss of 
biodiversity, which is commonly highlighted as a point of difference between 
biodiversity offsets and more conventional ‘mitigation’ (Brownlie & Botha 2009; 
Gardner & von Hase 2012; McKenney & Kiesecker 2010; Moilanen et al. 2008). 
The goal of no net loss of biodiversity also does not exist in New Zealand 
legislation, although it is referred to from time to time in relation to specific cases.  
In the absence of an appropriate existing definition, ecological compensation is 
defined in the present research as: 
“Positive conservation actions required by resource consent, and intended 
to compensate for residual adverse effects of development and resource 
use” 
The compensatory requirements encountered in this research were referred to as 
mitigation, compensation or biodiversity offsets, were undertaken both onsite and 
offsite, and were both in-kind and out-of-kind exchanges. All shared the broad 
intention of counterbalancing the ecological impacts of the development in 
question by undertaking a project that had a positive conservation benefits 
(restoration, habitat creation), and were in addition to activities that sought to 
mitigate adverse effects directly (e.g. sediment control). Several requirements 
encountered would perhaps fail to strictly qualify as compensatory actions 
depending on the circumstances (e.g. translocation, which is considered 
‘avoidance’ more than ‘mitigation’); however they were treated in the consent as 
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being intended to achieve the same purpose, so were subject to the same 
assessment. The validity of the requirements is not the subject of this research 
paper.  
4.2.2 Research objectives 
The present research aimed to answer three key questions: 
Determining compliance - what are the levels of compliance presently being 
achieved with ecological compensation requirements in resource consents? 
Determining variation in compliance - does the level of compliance differ between 
different types of activities, applicants and conditions, and in what ways? 
Determining predictors of compliance - what process and consent variables are 
predictors of compliance? 
4.2.3 Determining compliance 
A lack of policy goals in New Zealand related to ecological compensation meant 
typical policy evaluation methods (Bennear & Coglianese 2004; Laurian et al. 
2010) could not be used for the present research. A case study approach was 
instead employed, whereby cases were assessed for their compliance with consent 
conditions. The assessment of compliance was undertaken independent of agency 
monitoring records (often observed to be missing, incomplete or out of date) to 
ensure a consistent assessment across different councils. All conditions assessed 
were legally binding under the RMA – case studies that did not have specified 
enforceable compensation requirements were excluded from analysis. Projects 
were at varying stages of completion, but conditions were only assessed if 
sufficient time and progress had been made to assess it. Only the conditions that 
related to the ecological compensation were assessed, and were taken as a 
surrogate for goals of the policy tool in the absence of policy and guidance being 
available. 
4.2.4 Determining variation in compliance 
We determined that assessing compliance was the first step for this research, but 
that understanding the complexities of non-compliance was important as there is 
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very little information, empirical data and peer reviewed literature in New 
Zealand on this important topic. Non-compliance is not typically uniform across 
all activity types, applicants and types of requirement (International Network for 
Environmental Compliance and Enforcement 2009; Ministry for the Environment 
2008; Shimshack 2007). In discussions throughout the country, most expert 
practitioners were easily able to recount the industries and other activity types that 
both dominated the consent application figures and those that were known to be 
non-compliant more frequently than others. Therefore, the principal activity that 
pertained to each condition was compared with compliance to investigate if there 
were differences in compliance between activity types in RMA consents. 
Applicants were grouped into 3 categories to compare relative compliance: public 
organisations, private companies and private individuals. A ‘public organisation’ 
for the purpose of this study included state-owned enterprises (registered 
companies that were typically former government departments, now operating on 
a commercial basis under the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986) and agencies 
such as councils.  
Some types of conditions were widely considered by the experts consulted in the 
planning of the research programme to be more likely to be complied with than 
others, for reasons of the availability of expertise, resourcing and other variables. 
The 245 conditions were clubbed into two categories comparing conditions which 
were administrative and non-administrative (i.e. action-based). The conditions 
were then further split into 14 groups that aligned broadly with their goals or 
purpose (as in Matthews and Endress, 2008) and compliance between those 
groups was compared.  
4.2.5 Determining predictors of compliance 
The present research examined the role that variables in the planning process and 
variables relating to the content of the consent play in predicting or otherwise 
influencing compliance.  Understanding this role is important for ensuring that the 
impact assessment process, as far as possible, manages the risks of trade-offs. 
‘Process variables’ related to the impact assessment process (presence of a 
professional ecologist, early mention of compensation in the process, 
compensation proposed by the applicant, detailed plan required before granting 
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and public notification of the proposal) while ‘consent variables’ related to the 
requirements in the consent and nature of the trade-off (timing of the 
compensation action, requirement for an RMA bond, requirement for monitoring 
by the applicant and the presence of a review condition). An assessment of 
correlation with compliance was undertaken for the following variables to shed 
light on critical elements of the impact assessment process with respect to 
managing trade-offs. 
4.2.5.1 Process variables 
Professional input and assessment is widely considered to be an essential 
component of establishing and implementing robust exchanges in the context of 
ecological compensation (ten Kate et al. 2004), and maintains a degree of 
scientific rigour in respect of environmental management more broadly 
(Morrison-Saunders & Bailey 1999). The compliance of cases where the input of 
a professional ecologist had been engaged by the applicant was therefore 
compared with where the applicant had proceeded through the process without 
that advice. 
Early mention of ecological compensation in the process of impact assessment is 
good practice, as it enables a full analysis of the likely costs and benefits of the 
requirement (Morrison-Saunders & Pope 2013). Compliance in cases where there 
was clear evidence that the compensation had been discussed early in the 
application stages was compared with those where it was first considered very late 
in the process (such as in response to submitters at the hearing). Cases where the 
applicant had scoped and proposed the nature of the ecological compensation 
were also compared with where the council had proposed it, in a similar way to 
Bailey (1992) which distinguished between conditions that were proposed by the 
applicant and those imposed by the agency. This distinction was determined from 
reviewing the background information and officers’ decision report under section 
42(a) of the RMA.  
Although it could be considered best practice, it is not a legal requirement that 
detailed plans for compensation requirements are provided to the agency prior to 
the decision, and for many reasons this requirement is delayed to a nominal period 
following granting (often, six months). In many cases, this approach has practical 
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reasons, particularly for sites that require significant geotechnical modification. 
Delaying detail also enables the planning process to be sped up on the promise of 
more information to be submitted in broad accordance with an overall plan, but 
this promise is often not fulfilled. Whether or not a detailed plan was available at 
the time of decision was recorded for each case study. 
Resource consent applications are sometimes publicly notified under section 94 of 
the RMA, if they are likely to result in significant effects beyond the subject site 
(RMA,1991). This forms the ‘public participation’ opportunity commonly 
referred to within impact assessment and invites additional scrutiny from the 
wider community of a given proposal (Morrison-Saunders et al. 2001; Morrison-
Saunders & Early 2008). Compliance for conditions that were publicly notified 
was compared with those that were processed on a non-notified basis. 
4.2.5.2 Consent variables 
Timing of when a compensation action is required to be delivered affects the 
certainty of its delivery (Gardner & von Hase 2012; Greer & Som 2010; Maron et 
al. 2012; McKenney & Kiesecker 2010; Walker et al. 2009). Requiring benefits 
from compensation actions to be demonstrated in advance of a project have self-
evident advantages over those that are undertaken concurrent with or following a 
project. The timing of the compensation actions were divided between those 
which were required in advance, concurrent with, and required following the 
development, and their relationship with compliance compared. 
A bond required under section 108 (Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA)  
1991), an “RMA bond”, acts as a form of insurance on works required within a 
consent.  A cash or bank guaranteed payment is made up front. In the event of a 
default by the applicant to meet bonded requirements, the agency is granted the 
ability to uplift the funds and carry out the required works. Compliance with 
conditions that were part of cases that had RMA bond requirements was compared 
with cases where section 108 had not been used in respect of those conditions. 
Monitoring of the actions and outcomes related to a project and the mitigation 
requirements that are present is a fundamental requirement of impact assessment 
follow up and good resource management practice and should be ‘extensive and 
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long-term’ (Bailey et al. 1992). For each condition, it was recorded whether or not 
the relevant consent also contained a condition for the applicant or its agent to 
undertake monitoring. 
The inclusion of a review conditions is standard practice in RMA consenting, 
although they are rarely triggered (Milne 2008). The review condition is based on 
section 128 of the Act which provides for the issuing agency to serve notice on 
the applicant of a decision to review the conditions of the consent for a range of 
possible reasons, including unforeseen level of adverse effects (Resource 
Management Act 1991 (RMA 1991). We tested whether the presence of such a 
condition did have a relationship with compliance in this study, in that its 
inclusion in consent conditions would act as a deterrent to non-compliance, 
although it was expected that it would not due to rarity of usage. 
4.3 Methodology 
The methodology used case studies to analysing compliance with ecological 
compensation requirements, which is a common approach in the literature to date 
(Breaux et al. 2005; Hornyak & Halvorsen 2003; Reiss et al. 2009). Case study-
based research is valuable for examining, at a detailed level, complex phenomena 
in context (Cassell & Symon 2004).  In this research, investigation of a wide 
range of case studies enabled systematic micro-scale evaluation of EIA as 
outlined in Marshall et al (2005). The way case studies were selected is described, 
followed by the methodology applying to addressing each of the three research 
questions.  
4.3.1 Case study selection 
For this research, regional and district councils were asked via email to provide 
examples of case studies that matched our criteria (Table 1).  
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Table 1.     Case study criteria for data requested from Councils.  
 
Random selection was not feasible for several reasons: 
 There is no central national repository of consent information 
 There is rarely any recording of compensation requirements in council 
filing systems 
 Information collection and consent administration processes are highly 
variable across councils 
The numbers of cases provided by the councils varied from one through to 12, 
with 110 offered across all regions of the country.  Of those 110 cases, 81 had 
sufficiently progressed to enable compliance to be ascertained. Several prominent 
cases were also included at the suggestion of expert advisors to both increase the 
sample size and to capture important examples. The statistical significance of the 
Permission to have been issued between 1 Jan 1992 and 31 Dec 2010 under the Resource 
Management Act 1991 
Permission to have pertained to a negative effect on the biophysical environment, including 
but not limited to: resource take, vegetation clearance, discharges to land or water, stream, 
waterway or coastal modification under a Regional or District Plan 
Permission to have included a negotiation for ecological compensation under the Resource 
Management Act 1991 
A reasonable time has elapsed, such that the activity for which permission was granted ought 
to have been carried out 
Sites in which permission from both regional & territorial authorities were required are 
acceptable 
Sites in which an outline plan has been submitted with respect to a designation are acceptable, 
providing the compensation can be clearly attributed to the activity that the outline plan shows 
The compensation can be anything negotiated through the planning process; from planting, 
species translocation, financial contributions etc. 
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sample size is not able to be determined, because agencies do not record the total 
number of consents issued with ecological compensation requirements each year. 
The case studies were located all over New Zealand, in every region of the 
country and all related to one or a bundle of consents issued by a district or 
regional council (sometimes both). The most common form of compensation 
action was planting, such as habitat creation, restoration or enhancement. Other 
requirements included pest control, financial payments and the formal handover 
of tenure to an agency (vesting). Many of the trade-offs were indirect or loose, 
where quite dissimilar ecological values were exchanged (i.e. stream diversion 
and riparian corridor loss in exchange for restoration planting of hill slope habitat). 
This scenario is common in New Zealand where quantification and demonstration 
of ecological equivalence is not mandated.  
4.3.2 Determining compliance 
Previous studies overseas have found that low levels of routine consent 
monitoring and poor record-keeping by agencies have made desktop analyses of 
compliance, based on requested monitoring files, inadequate (Hornyak & 
Halvorsen 2003; Reiss et al. 2009; Walker et al. 2009). Reducing the reliance on 
agency record-keeping therefore seemed essential for the present research. As a 
result, the determination of compliance levels achieved with the 245 conditions 
was generally undertaken onsite; supported by an independent review of the 
relevant consent files, consultation with stakeholders, and investigation into other 
monitoring and financial data held by the issuing council (e.g. transaction 
information for the purpose of tracking a bond or financial payment). To assess 
compliance, a multi-point scale (Table 2) was used, similar to those commonly 
used by regional and district councils in enforcement and in previous studies of 
condition compliance (Breaux et al. 2005; Environment Canterbury 2009; Tonkin 
& Taylor 2012). 
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Table 2.     The compliance scale used to assess each case in this study. 
Compliance scale Description 
0 – No compliance 
No apparent attempt to achieve compliance with the stated 
condition 
1 – High level of non-compliance Minor or insignificant attempt made to achieve compliance 
2 – Medium level of non-compliance 
Significant effort apparent in meeting the condition, but falls short 
of full compliance 
3 – Satisfactory compliance 
Acceptable compliance that is within a practical margin of error 
and minor flexibility 
 
The compliance with conditions was assessed on a 0-3 scale as detailed in Table 2, 
rather than a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ mark to reflect that degrees of non-compliance 
are often present and to make the dataset more meaningful. A score of 0 was 
given where no effort was apparent to meet the conditions, and a score of 1 was 
given when some effort was apparent, but it fell well short of what was required. 
A score of 2 was given where the requirements were clearly not met, but a 
substantial effort had been made, while a score of 3 was given where the 
condition was demonstrably met. If there was minor deviation from the stated 
goals then a score of 3 was still given. For the sake of consistency, the score 
reflects the level of compliance with the condition in question and does not 
automatically translate to the level of seriousness of adverse effect. For example, a 
failure to submit a monitoring report, which would constitute a high level of non 
compliance in relation to the relevant condition, is not likely to cause a serious 
adverse effect.  
4.3.3 Determining variation in compliance 
Activity, applicant and condition types were grouped and compared for their 
respective relationship with compliance scores in order to better understand the 
nature of non-compliance. The consents were first divided into 10 activity type 
categories (see Table 5) in order to compare the activity type with the level of 
compliance achieved. It is important to note that each may contain elements of the 
other, such as subdivision consents that collectively included many of the other 
types of conditions; but the categorisation refers to the principal activity. 
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Secondly, consents were allocated to three applicant categories of private 
company, private individual and an aggregated category comprising state-owned 
enterprises and public organisations to compare compliance levels between them. 
Thirdly, conditions were clubbed into two categories: ‘administrative’ conditions, 
(generally paper-based such as the payment of a bond, lodging of a financial 
contribution or the vesting of land into estate of an agency) and ‘non-
administrative’, which were those that were conservation action-oriented and 
typically related to an active requirement in the field such as planting. Finally, 
they were divided into 14 categories (Table 3) in accordance with the type of 
ecological compensation requirement they related to. 
Table 3.     Compensation consent condition categories. 
Administrative Non-administrative 
RMA Bond Hydrological changes 
Mitigation trust Maintenance/Pests 
Plan content Restoration intention 
Monitoring Planting 
Consent notice/Covenant Fencing 
Vesting of land  Translocation 
Financial Payment  
Protection (restriction)  
 
4.3.4 Determining predictors of compliance 
As outlined in detail in the Introduction, a list of 9 variables (Table 4) likely to 
have an impact on eventual levels of compliance was developed with the input of 
expert advisors and a review of the literature on the implementation of ecological 
compensation.  
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Table 4.     Variables that were considered for each case, categorised as either process or 
consent variables. 
Process Consent 
Variable Explanation Variable Explanation 
Professional 
ecologist 
Was a professional ecologist 
engaged by the applicant during the 
process of applying for consent? 
Timing 
Was the compensation action 
was required prior, concurrent 
with or following the activity 
that has been consented (i.e. a 
development)? 
Early 
mention 
Was the compensation action was 
mentioned early in the process, or 
alternatively was it late in the 
process at around the time of 
granting in response to agency or 
submitter concerns 
RMA bond 
Was a bond required for the 
compensation works (i.e. 
under section 108 of the 
RMA)? 
Applicant 
proposed 
Was there evidence that the 
applicant proposed the 
compensation action?  
Monitoring 
Was monitoring required as a 
condition of the consent? 
Plan before 
Was a detailed plan submitted prior 
to consent being granted?  
Review 
condition 
Was a review condition under 
Section 128 of the RMA 
present in the consent?  
Notification 
Was the consent in question 
notified, limited notified or non-
notified  
 
4.3.5 Data analysis 
The Chi-squared test was used to determine whether significant relationships 
existed between a response variable (the score attained in a ranking of regulatory 
compliance) and a range of predictor variables, as it has been used before in 
previous compliance audits (Bailey et al. 1992; Hornyak & Halvorsen 2003). Chi-
squared test assesses whether paired observations on two variables, expressed in a 
contingency table, are independent of each other, the null hypothesis being that 
they are. In this case, each (mostly binary) predictor variable was compared 
against the categorical response variable for the level of compliance attained. 
Under the null hypothesis, the compliance levels will be similar in the presence or 
the absence of the factor. However, differing compliance levels will result in a 
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larger value of the Chi-squared test statistics and a smaller p-value. Chi-squares 
tests were conducted at a 5% level of significance, i.e. the null hypothesis was 
rejected if the p-value was smaller than 0.05 (Agresti 1996).  
4.4 Results 
In summary, the present research has examined 81 case studies, comprising 259 
separate conditions of consent, across New Zealand, for the levels of compliance 
with ecological compensation requirements. For 14 of those conditions, it was not 
possible to determine whether they had been complied with or not so they were 
excluded from the analysis.  
4.4.1 Determining compliance 
For the 245 conditions assessed, compliance overall was 64.8%, meaning that in 
approximately two-thirds of cases the condition’s requirements were met 
(Figure 1). The remainder were non-compliant to varying degrees [0 (15.2%), 1 
(9.4%) and 2 (10.7%)].  
 
 
Figure 1. Number of conditions in compliance categories. The percentage values at the top of 
bars show the proportions in that category of the total number of different conditions 
recorded in this study (n ¼ 245). 
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4.4.2 Determining variation in compliance 
Compliance varied significantly with consent type (X
2 
= 73.207, df = 9, P = 0.000) 
as shown in Table 5. Consents related to agriculture exhibited the lowest overall 
level of compliance (4.76% with a score of 3), whereas energy generation 
successfully complied in respect of all 11 conditions assessed (100% with score of 
3).  
Table 5.     The distribution of cases (%) across the compliance scale for different categories 
of consent assessed in this study.  
Consent category Number 0 1 2 3 
Energy generation 11 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
Education 8 0.0 0.0 12.5 87.5 
Subdivision 104 8.7 11.5 6.7 73.1 
Resource extraction 30 13.3 3.3 13.3 70.0 
Recreational 14 7.1 14.3 14.3 64.3 
Water discharge 22 9.1 9.1 18.2 63.6 
Water take 10 0.0 20.0 20.0 60.0 
Infrastructure 18 27.8 11.1 5.6 55.6 
Waste management 6 16.7 16.7 16.7 50.0 
Agriculture 21 71.4 4.8 19.0 4.8 
Note: See Table 2 for a description of the compliance scale. 
 
Compliance varied significantly with applicant type (X
2 
= 13.243, df = 6, P = 
0.039) as shown in Table 6. Public organisations and state-owned enterprises 
exhibited greater likelihood of attaining compliance (75.51%), followed by 
private companies (65.49%) and private individuals (54.72%).  
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Table 6.     The distribution of cases (%) across the compliance scale for different categories 
of applicant assessed in this study. 
Applicant category Number 0 1 2 3 
Combined SOE/PO 49 14.3 8.2 2.0 75.5 
Private company 142 10.6 11.3 12.7 65.5 
Private individual 53 26.4 5.7 13.2 54.7 
Note: See Table 2 for a description of the compliance scale. 
 
Administrative conditions were generally complied with more often than non-
administrative (X
2 
= 34.022, df = 3, P = 0.000). Conditions that are administrative 
in nature were fully complied with in 82.61% of cases, which is significantly 
more often than those that require action on the ground (49.61%) as shown in 
Table 7.   
 
Table 7.     The distribution of cases (%) across the compliance scale for administrative and 
non-administrative conditions assessed in this study. 
 
Number 0 1 2 3 
Administrative 115 13.0 2.6 1.7 82.6 
Non-administrative 129 16.3 15.5 18.6 49.6 
Note: See Table 2 for a description of the compliance scale. 
 
The two categories were further broken down in Table 8, and showed that 
mitigation trust establishment exhibited the lowest level of compliance of the 
administrative conditions; however as there are only two examples they are 
unlikely to provide an accurate indication of expected compliance.  
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Table 8.     A breakdown of the distribution of cases (%) across the compliance scale within 
the administrative and non-administrative condition categories presented in Table 7. 
Administrative Number 0 1 2 3 
Bond  14 14.3 0.0 0.0 85.7 
Mitigation trust  2 50.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 
Plan content  29 0.0 6.9 3.5 89.7 
Consent notice/Covenant  18 11.1 5.6 0.0 83.3 
Vesting of land 8 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
Financial Payment  17 17.7 0.0 0.0 82.4 
Monitoring  22 31.8 0.0 4.6 63.6 
Protection (restriction)  5 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
Non-administrative           
Hydrological changes 5 0.0 20.0 40.0 40.0 
Maintenance/Pests  38 7.9 18.4 18.4 55.3 
Restoration Intention  10 50.0 20.0 0.0 30.0 
Planting  58 10.3 15.5 22.4 51.7 
Fencing  17 35.3 5.9 11.8 47.1 
Translocation  1 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Note: See Table 2 for a description of the compliance scale. 
 
4.4.3 Determining predictors of compliance  
Nine variables related to the planning process were tested for their relationship 
with compliance with the 245 conditions. Five variables that were considered did 
show a significant relationship with the eventual level of compliance attained 
(Table 9). 
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Table 9.     Pairs of predictors with statistically significant differences in the distribution of 
cases (%) across the compliance scale, pairs are marked with the same symbol (p<0.5). 
Predictor Number 0 1 2 3  
Action required after activity 139 19.4 12.2 11.5 56.8 * 
Action required concurrent or before 105 9.5 5.7 9.5 75.2 * 
Action proposed late in process 101 27.7 11.9 15.8 44.6 + 
Action proposed early in process 143 6.3 7.7 7.0 79.0 + 
Action not proposed by applicant 84 25.0 8.3 15.5 51.2 º 
Action proposed by applicant 160 10.0 10.0 8.1 71.9 º 
Detailed plan not required before granting 182 17.0 8.2 12.1 62.6 ٭ 
Detailed plan required before granting 59 5.1 13.6 6.8 74.6 ٭ 
RMA bond not required  150 16.7 6.0 13.3 64.0 - 
RMA bond required 94 12.8 14.9 6.4 66.0 - 
Note: See Table 2 for a description of the compliance scale. 
 
Higher levels of compliance (X
2 
=9.911, df = 3, P = 0.019) occurred where the 
requirements were required before or concurrent with an activity (75.24%) of 
requirements were met in comparison to when the requirements were not required 
to be done until following the project (56.83%). The point in the planning process 
at which the compensation is first proposed also has a significant relationship with 
compliance (X
2 
= 34.236, df = 3, P = 0.000). If the compensation was raised and 
discussed early in the process, the requirements were met in 79.02% of cases, 
compared with 44.55% for those that were discussed late in the process, typically 
at the time of granting.  
Compensation proposed by the applicant (and subsequently included in the 
consent) is also more likely to be complied with (71.88%) compared with that 
which is imposed by the agency or advocated for by submitters, with those 
conditions being met in 51.19% of cases (X
2 
= 14.768, df = 3, P = 0.002). In cases 
where a plan was required prior to granting, the compliance levels were 
significantly higher (X
2 
= 7.961, df = 3, P = 0.047) with 74.58% of conditions 
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being met, compared with 62.64% where a detailed plan was not submitted prior. 
A condition with a bond attached to it under section 108 of the RMA is more 
likely to be complied with than one that did not require a bond (X
2 
= 8.083, df = 3, 
P = 0.044), although the percentages of 64.00% and 65.96% respectively were 
very similar. 
 
Table 10.     Groups of predictors without statistically significant differences in the 
distribution of cases (%) across the compliance scale, groups are marked with the same 
symbol (p<0.5). 
Predictor No. 0 1 2 3  
Professional ecologist not involved 65 18.5 9.2 15.4 56.9 * 
Professional ecologist involved 179 14.0 9.5 8.9 67.6 * 
Monitoring requirements absent 71 11.3 7.0 14.1 67.6 + 
Monitoring requirements in consent 173 16.7 10.4 9.2 63.7 + 
Review condition not present 122 16.4 9.8 9.0 64.8 º 
Review condition present 122 13.9 9.0 12.3 64.8 º 
Notification 79 12.7 11.4 11.4 64.6 ٭ 
Limited notification 15 40.0 0.0 13.3 46.7 ٭ 
Non-notification 150 14.0 9.3 10.0 66.7 ٭ 
Note: See Table 2 for a description of the compliance scale. 
 
There was no significant relationship between the input of a professional ecologist 
and the eventual level of compliance; neither did a requirement for monitoring. 
Review conditions included under section 128 of the RMA were present in 
approximately half of the cases, and did not have a significant relationship with 
compliance; neither did the requirement for public notification (full or limited) of 
the initial consent application (Table 10).  
4.5 Discussion 
Three research questions were posed at the outset and the following discussion 
deals with each in turn, providing interpretation of the results and comparing and 
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contrasting our results with others obtained in New Zealand and internationally. 
The results show that two-thirds (64.8%) of conditions relating to ecological 
compensation are satisfactorily met. However, it is the nature of non-compliance 
with the remainder that is the focus of this paper; and in particular, the ecological 
implications of that non-compliance. The results go on to show that the level of 
non-compliance is not evenly distributed through the different activities, applicant 
types and condition types. Finally, variables within the planning process and those 
related to the final form of the permission that is granted, show varied 
relationships with compliance that are of interest to improving the practice of 
managing trade-offs within environmental impact assessment.  
4.5.1 Determining compliance 
The level of overall compliance with conditions was 64.8%, meaning that in two 
thirds of cases the condition’s requirements were met satisfactorily. The Ministry 
for the Environment (MfE) coordinates a biannual survey of local government 
agencies, investigating (among other things) levels of monitoring and compliance 
with consent conditions. The 2010/2011 MfE survey reported that of the consents 
that ‘required monitoring’, 68% were monitored and 72% of those 68% found to 
be complying with their conditions (Ministry for the Environment 2011). Note 
that this level of compliance considered all conditions in contrast to our research 
which focussed only on compensatory conditions. Nevertheless, overall 
compliance levels found were of a similar magnitude.  
A compliance audit of several artificial waterway projects in Western Australia by 
Bailey et al (1992) found a similar compliance rate of 63% with conditions that 
related to the mitigation of adverse effects. Hornyak & Halvorsen found 
compliance rates of 44% and 60% for country road agency and general public 
wetland mitigation requirements respectively. Breaux et al (2005) found that an 
assessment of 18 wetlands saw 17 ranked as ‘good’ for compliance, with 8 fully 
complying with both permit criteria and ecological indicators of success (Breaux 
et al. 2005). This research suggests that better and increased use of security and 
insurance mechanisms, and research and innovation into alternatives is needed; as 
our research (like most) show levels of compliance that mean a large proportion 
of ecological compensation requirements do not eventuate.  
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4.5.2 Determining variation in compliance 
The heterogeneity of non-compliance across industries and activity types is best 
reflected by the contrast of compliance levels between agriculture and energy 
generation, which was extreme and appears to signal a need for further research as 
to the reasons for such different levels of performance in this study. In respect of 
applicants, highest levels of compliance were achieved by public organisations, 
followed by private companies and then private individuals. Hornyak & 
Halvorsen (2003) found, by contrast, the county road agency in Michigan, USA (a 
‘public organisation’ with a significant degree of interaction with the regulator) 
was less likely to comply with requirements (44%) compared with permittees that 
were part of the general public (either ‘private companies’ or ‘private 
individuals’), with compliance levels of 60% (Hornyak & Halvorsen 2003). The 
data also showed that non-administrative conditions are much less likely to be 
complied with than administrative, which reveals that although overall 
compliance compares favourably with national level estimates, that the nature and 
scale of non compliance with respect to ecological outcomes is inferior. These 
findings contrast with previous studies that found no difference in compliance 
across condition types (Bailey et al. 1992).  
Understanding the specific profile of non-compliance in an area can help agencies 
and their communities prioritise scarce education and monitoring resources, in 
order to improve their enforcement strategies (Hornyak & Halvorsen 2003). This 
research shows that level of non-compliance differs between the type of activity, 
applicant and condition type; and indicates that regulatory agencies would benefit 
from understanding the relevant trends within their jurisdiction in order to ensure 
environmental impact assessment procedures take account of different trends and 
risks.  
4.5.3 Determining predictors of compliance 
Understanding the variables that are more likely to have an impact on the eventual 
level of compliance can help to inform and improve planning practice, and this 
assists agencies in managing risk of default through the impact assessment 
process. Of the 9 variables hypothesised to correlate with compliance, 5 showed 
significant correlation while 4 were weakly or not correlated.   
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4.5.3.1 Factors with insignificant impact on compliance 
Variables which the dataset showed were insignificant in terms of a relationship 
with eventual levels of compliance included the input of a professional ecologist, 
the presence of monitoring requirements for the applicant or third party, public 
notification of the application, and the presence of a review condition.  
In most cases, the professional ecologist (if there was one engaged during the 
initial planning stages), did not appear to have been retained throughout 
implementation. This was difficult to determine due to quality of record-keeping 
in many cases, so was not part of the formal assessment. For example, if a report 
was produced by an ecologist a period of time following implementation, it could 
not be assumed that he or she had overseen the implementation works. The lack of 
apparent effect of a professional ecologist’s input may also signal low quality 
advice being provided to clients, or poor efficacy of the manner in which 
professional contributions are considered in project planning. Further research on 
these matters is desirable. 
The presence of monitoring requirements in the consent did not have a strong 
correlation with higher levels of compliance, which was somewhat surprising. 
There are a number of possible explanations for this. The first is that the 
monitoring conditions were only met 63.64% of the time. The second is that the 
monitoring conditions were of varying quality and detail, from requiring a letter 
confirmation of works having met conditions at the time of assessment, through to 
detailed and long-term monitoring of water quality with appropriate feedback 
loops. Finally, there was evidence of reports having been submitted but not 
necessarily being acknowledged or acted upon by the agency, which may 
diminish the incentive to comply if there is a perception of a lack of oversight. 
Our results also showed that public notification had no significant relationship 
with compliance, and neither did the presence of a review condition.  
4.5.3.2 Factors with significant impact on compliance 
Where compensatory actions were required before or concurrent with the 
consented activity, the likelihood of compliance was observed to be significantly 
higher. There were very few examples of prior requirements, so it is not clear to 
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what degree prior requirements are also stronger than those that are undertaken 
concurrently. It is also usually impractical to delay projects until after full 
outcomes of an ecological compensation requirement are demonstrated. At 
present in New Zealand, there is no formal framework to package advance 
mitigation programs as may be able to occur overseas (including species banking, 
wetland mitigation banks and credit trading in other forms). It is probable that an 
absence of regulatory certainty that the works will be recognised as compensating 
for a later activity dissuades developers from undertaking advanced works.  
Where compensation requirements were mentioned early in the process, and 
presumably better integrated into project planning including timelines, eventual 
levels of compliance are higher. The data indicates that compliance is more likely 
to be achieved if the full scope and nature of activities are determined by the time 
of granting consent. Together, the correlation with compliance of both the early 
mention of ecological compensation, and the detailed planning through the project 
planning stages is strong. This aligns with best practice for the purpose of 
managing trade-offs in environmental impact assessment, where systematic 
consideration of a project and detailed planning is viewed as critical (Morrison-
Saunders & Pope 2013). 
The presence of an RMA bond on a condition had a significant positive 
correlation with compliance although weaker than most other measures. A weaker 
correlation than expected could be due to a number of factors. For example, bonds 
are often set too low, so that they are insufficient to pay for the works required. 
Where default occurs and a bond is in place that is unlikely to cover the cost of 
the works, the requiring agency may not undertake to take action as they will be 
required to meet the shortfall. Overall, bonds were only required in 25 cases of 
110 cases overall. For a mechanism that represents a relatively simple form of 
insurance, the low usage of the section 108 provision for a bond to be requested 
was surprising. Throughout the research, it was apparent the available security 
measures were often not utilised, and that further innovation into improving the 
range of these measures available would be advantageous. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
The results of the research also show that there is a clear need to understand the 
complexities of non-compliance as they apply to trade-offs that justify 
development at the expense of ecological values. Our research showed that 64.8% 
of ecological compensation requirements are met, and that there was significant 
variation in compliance across different activity, applicant and condition types. 
The significant number of conditions not complied with indicate that present tools 
and practice within the domestic field of impact assessment are not securing the 
necessary benefits from ecological compensation requirements that are required. 
Our research also showed that process-related and consent-related variables are 
often powerful predictors of levels of compliance. Understanding the nature of 
non-compliance will assist in improving the manner in which trade-offs such as 
ecological compensation are managed in environmental impact assessment.  
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Chapter 5 
Compensating for ecological harm: the 
state of play in New Zealand
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Abstract 
Ecological compensation involves measures to create positive conservation 
outcomes intended to offset the residual impacts of development (e.g. restoration 
planting, pest control). Rarely, however, have the exchanges arranged been 
subject to objective assessment. Here we assess 110 cases of ecological 
compensation involving diverse New Zealand ecosystems on the basis of how 
they addressed the six key implementation issues identified by McKenney and 
Kiesecker (2010: Environmental Management 45: 165–176): equivalence, 
location (i.e. spatial proximity), additionality, timing, duration and compliance, 
and currencies. Our research showed that habitat enhancement and protection is 
the most common form of ecological compensation, and that 72 of 110 case 
studies undertook compensation on the same site or immediately adjacent. The 
                                                 
2
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great majority (94.5%) of compensation was required by condition of resource 
consent to be demonstrated after the development had proceeded, with an average 
of 11.3 years of continuing management or monitoring required. The most 
common form of security other than a consent condition was a covenant (29 of 
110 cases) followed by a resource management bond (25). We also found that in 
97 cases there was no objective quantification of the compensation needed to 
make up for impact losses, with the requirements being devised by negotiation 
between parties with the assistance of expert input. We recognise the potential of 
ecological compensation as a policy tool, but recommend that significant 
improvements are made to its implementation to enhance ecological outcomes. 
Keywords: ecological compensation; mitigation; offset; RMA 
 
5.2 Introduction 
The need to extract resources, alter land use and dispose of waste results in 
continuing adverse effects on biodiversity and ecosystems. Ecological 
compensation, although widely criticised for failures of implementation (Hornyak 
& Halvorsen 2003; Gibbons & Lindenmayer 2007; Burgin 2008; Walker et al. 
2009), is promoted as a potentially important mechanism to alleviate the pressures 
of ongoing development and to contribute to achieving wider conservation goals 
(BBOP 2009; Quertier & Lavorel 2011; Gillespie 2012). Ecological compensation 
is typically an agreed positive conservation action intended to compensate for 
losses of habitat and ecosystem function caused by development and resource use. 
It is a commonly used mechanism that brings together the often conflicting 
priorities of environmental protection and economic development, in a system of 
trade-offs. These trade-offs are inherent in environmental management and occur 
at all stages of the development process (Murray & Swaffield 1994; Morrison-
Saunders & Pope 2013). 
At present, ecological compensation in New Zealand is implemented under both 
the Resource Management Act 1991 (hereafter RMA) and the Conservation Act 
1987, typically as a condition of approval for development to occur. New Zealand 
does not have an explicit policy framework for ecological compensation. While 
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ecological science contributes to the determination of appropriate compensation, 
such agreements are typically the product of negotiation between parties 
(Galatowitsch 2012). There is no national-level policy on the matter and very few 
regional and local planning instruments make specific reference to ecological 
compensation. Most resource consents do not include outcome-oriented 
conditions, as demonstrated in our related study of regulatory compliance with 
ecological compensation, where just 10 conditions of 245 specifically articulated 
a restoration-related outcome (Brown et al. 2013). In the general absence of goals 
that specifically relate to the implementation goals of ecological compensation, 
we draw upon an existing framework to facilitate assessment and evaluation of the 
New Zealand example. We examine the ecological compensation requirements in 
110 case studies of resource consents issued under the RMA, against the six key 
implementation issues identified by McKenney and Kiesecker (2010): 
equivalence, location (i.e. spatial proximity), additionality, timing, duration and 
compliance, and the use of currencies and ratios in determining appropriate 
compensation. McKenney and Kiesecker discussed the overall approach to 
applying the concept, the presence or absence of the goal of no net loss of 
biodiversity, and the use of the mitigation hierarchy. We also consider these 
elements in the New Zealand context. 
In New Zealand, ecological compensation is referred to mainly as mitigation, 
compensation or biodiversity-offsetting, with varying and evolving opinions on 
the distinctions between each of those terms that is not always consistent with use 
of that same term in other jurisdictions (Christensen 2008; Norton 2008). It is, 
however, likely that implementation issues across all types of ecological 
compensation are broadly the same, and are articulated in planning permissions 
(‘resource consents’ under the RMA) in a similar manner. In this research 
therefore, ‘ecological compensation’ is an umbrella term defined as: 
Positive conservation actions required by resource 
consent, and intended to compensate for residual adverse 
effects of development and resource use (Brown et al. 
2013) 
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5.2.1 Ecological compensation under the RMA 
The RMA, New Zealand’s principal environmental legislation, does not 
specifically mention ecological compensation, nor is there a national-level policy 
to guide decision-making. Regional councils and city or district councils issue 
planning permission (in the form of resource consents) to allow activities to be 
undertaken that have adverse effects and sometimes require ecological 
compensation. A proposal to mitigate, compensate or offset ecological harm is 
one of the wide range of factors that a consent authority can take into account 
under section 104 of the Act (which outlines matters the decision-maker must 
have regard to in determining whether to grant the consent and under what 
conditions). 
Internationally, policies that address ecological compensation typically emphasise 
the mitigation hierarchy (i.e. avoid ecological effects, minimise impacts, and 
finally mitigate or offset the residual effects; McKenney & Kiesecker 2010; 
Gardner & von Hase 2012). While New Zealand law does not explicitly require 
adherence to the mitigation hierarchy, in a recent Board of Inquiry decision on a 
plan change and accompanying resource consent related to a major roading 
project (Transmission Gully), it was noted that a mitigation hierarchy was 
supported by ecological evidence and was broadly consistent with the RMA 
(Environmental Protection Authority 2011; Christensen 2012). 
5.2.2 No net loss 
Ecological compensation, and biodiversity offsets in particular, are often 
highlighted as a mechanism to achieve ‘no net loss or preferably net gain’ of 
biodiversity (ten Kate et al. 2004). This generally requires that what is lost in 
development is counterbalanced by conservation gains that are at least equivalent 
and preferably greater in value, although the definition of this goal and 
measurement of success or failure varies across stakeholders and jurisdictions 
(Bull et al. 2013). It is articulated in the first of the 10 principles on biodiversity 
offsets developed by the Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP 
2009). The goal itself is criticised as being symbolic and rarely achieved (Burgin 
2010), with Walker et al. (2009) referring to it as ‘administratively improbable 
and technically unrealistic’. Further, as the Transmission Gully Board of Inquiry 
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noted, applicants can choose to state ‘no net loss’ as a goal, but they are not 
legislatively bound to demonstrate that it has been achieved (Environmental 
Protection Authority 2011). 
5.2.3 Key implementation issues 
There have been several comprehensive reviews worldwide of ecological 
compensation schemes and most reveal significant problems with implementation 
and follow-up (Hornyak & Halvorsen 2003; Gibbons & Lindenmayer 2007; 
Burgin 2010; Walker 2010; Quertier & Lavorel 2011). Here we use the 
framework proposed by McKenney and Kiesecker (2010) (summarised in Table 1) 
to examine compensation in the New Zealand context, and generate 
recommendations aimed at improving implementation. We chose to use this 
framework because of its broad applicability and clear articulation of key matters 
that facilitate a consistency with transferable learning outcomes. 
 
Table 1. Key implementation issues identified by McKenney and Keisecker (2010). 
Key issue Explanation 
Equivalence Equivalence and similarity of compensatory action with the impact 
being addressed (i.e. in-kind or out-of-kind) 
Spatial proximity Location of compensation in relation to the site of impact, with an 
assumption that closer is better 
Additionality The compensation action must be a new contribution to conservation 
that would not have otherwise occurred 
Timing Timing of demonstrating the compensation, relative to the timing of the 
impact 
Duration & compliance The required longevity of the compensation action and security of 
delivery 
Currency & ratios Metrics used to determine exchanges including mitigation replacement 
ratios 
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Ecological equivalence is a goal of compensatory mechanisms and can be 
determined at a range of scales. At the broadest scale, exchanges are grouped into 
in-kind or out-of-kind relating to the similarity of elements to be traded 
(McKenney & Kiesecker 2010). In-kind refers to protection or enhancement of a 
similar value while out-of-kind compensation involves different values of greater 
conservation significance (also referred to as a ‘trade-up’). 
Compensatory works should occur near the site of impact (McKenney & 
Kiesecker 2010) to avoid negative ecological and social outcomes of 
compensation at a distance. In practice the investment of mitigation money 
leveraged from impacts on one habitat type is often used to ameliorate broader 
impacts affecting areas of higher strategic conservation importance (Blundell & 
Burkey 2007; McKenney & Kiesecker 2010). Aggregating efforts into large areas 
of habitat instead of many smaller and fragmented compensation projects located 
haphazardly around the landscape has been shown to perform better ecologically 
(Breaux et al. 2005; McKenney & Kiesecker 2010). 
Additionality demands that compensatory actions are new and would not have 
occurred under the status quo (McKenney & Kiesecker 2010). Assessment of 
additionality requires that the future level of management under the status quo 
must be reliably forecasted, which is difficult. Common approaches include set-
asides, habitat improvements or financial contributions. The level of additionality 
is dependent upon the current level of protection and management of the habitat 
(at a range of scales), as well as the inherent vulnerability of that habitat type. If 
the habitat set-aside is adequately represented elsewhere, already protected or not 
otherwise vulnerable, then it is not likely a new gain and therefore not additional 
(Gibbons & Lindenmayer 2007). 
The timing of compensatory benefits should be similar to the loss so that temporal 
equivalence is achieved, and lags between impact and compensation are 
minimised. Planting to offset the loss of existing older habitat may take decades or 
centuries to be of similar value to an extant habitat, with the time lag potentially 
risking threatened species’ population viability and leading to extinction (Gibbons 
& Lindenmayer 2007; Maron et al. 2010). Securing compensation gains in 
advance is the most efficient and reliable means of orchestrating robust exchanges 
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because it limits uncertainty (Bekessy et al. 2010; Gardner & von Hase 2012). 
Advance mitigation enables applicants to plan for and reliably demonstrate gains 
in advance, which may be important to securing access to diminishing resources 
such as minerals (Kuiper 1997; Greer & Som 2010). 
Failure to secure compensation exchanges because of issues with duration and 
compliance is a common shortcoming (Race & Fonseca 1996; Hornyak & 
Halvorsen 2003; Gibbons & Lindenmayer 2007; Burgin 2008; Matthews & 
Endress 2008; Brown et al. 2013). Post-decision failures of compliance (and 
subsequent enforcement) undermine compensation, and society bears the burden 
of unfulfilled promises (Beder 2000; Hornyak & Halvorsen 2003; Gibbons & 
Lindenmayer 2007; Keane et al. 2008; Bekessy et al. 2010; Brown et al. 2013). 
Compensation should persist for as long as the impact and permanent losses 
should not be offset by temporary gains (Gibbons & Lindenmayer 2007). While 
monitoring and follow-up are widely recognised as being of critical importance, 
they rarely receive sufficient attention (Rubec & Hanson 2009). 
Currencies that compare values of different habitats rely on surrogate measures of 
ecological value (Gibbons & Lindenmayer 2007). Assessment of habitat quality 
and condition can rely on predetermined indicators, or they may be established on 
an ad hoc, case-by-case basis (Quertier & Lavorel 2011). At the crudest level, 
extent of habitat lost and gained are compared (Quertier & Lavorel 2011). Habitat 
condition and rarity provide a more accurate reflection of ecological value, while 
use of multiple metrics or combinations of methods limits critical omissions 
(Kiesecker et al. 2009; Bull et al. 2013). However, methodologies continue to fail 
rigorous scrutiny, with a high likelihood of losses being obscured within broad 
considerations of value (Walker et al. 2009; Pawliczek & Sullivan 2011). 
5.3 Methods 
We assessed how each of the six implementation issues in McKenney & 
Kiesecker (2010) was addressed in 110 resource consents issued between 1991 
and 2010 by 39 councils across the North and South islands of New Zealand. 
Consent information typically included the consent itself, supporting 
documentation such as ecological surveys and agency officers’ reports, plans, and 
other documents such as covenants and was primarily provided on request by the 
92 
 
issuing agency. Further details on selection of examples and study design are 
available in Brown et al. (2013), while Table 2 reflects the types of activities 
investigated. We used the case-study approach as it provided for the detailed, 
contextual and multidimensional analysis of a wide range of examples of 
ecological compensation, capturing variation and highlighting general trends 
beyond the circumstances of each individual situation (Gillham 2000; Crowe et al. 
2011). 
Table 2. Distribution of activity types in the consent case studies (n = 110). 
Activity type n % 
Subdivision 38 34.6 
Infrastructure 14 12.7 
Water discharge 12 10.9 
Agriculture 11 10 
Energy generation 10 9.1 
Resource extraction 8 7.3 
Water abstraction 7 6.4 
Recreational 4 3.6 
Waste management 4 3.6 
Other 2 1.8 
 
Equivalence 
We grouped the case studies into four categories according to their principal effect, 
and compared that with the main form of compensation required for each (Table 
3). In cases where a financial contribution was sought from the developer (n = 20), 
we differentiated between those that were ring-fenced for in-kind exchanges and 
those that had considerable flexibility in the way in which they were to be spent. 
An analysis of exchanges at the ecosystem level was not possible, as many 
consents did not contain enough information about the types of habitat involved in 
the exchange. 
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Spatial proximity 
The shortest distance between impact and compensation sites was measured in 
kilometres, with zero distance indicating ecological compensation undertaken on 
or immediately adjacent to the impacted site. Where the financial payment did not 
define a destination site but gave a scale such as ‘within catchment’, the furthest 
distance from the site to the edge of the catchment was used. 
Additionality 
We devised questions for each of the common compensation actions (set-asides, 
habitat improvements, financial payments, or a combination), in Table 4, and 
interrogated the information to assess whether additionality was achieved. 
 
Table 3. Questions devised for common scenarios in order to determine additionality of 
compensation. 
Compensation Questions 
Set-asides 1. Is there a formal means of protection in place for the set-aside? 
 
2. Is the area of the habitat already formally protected by some other means (e.g. 
covenant)? 
 3. Is there provision for management actions to be undertaken? 
 4. Was the area subsequently given to a public agency for management purposes? 
Habitat 
improvements 1. Will the works be undertaken to public or private land? 
 2. Do the works constitute the statutory responsibility of any agency? 
 
3. Were the works already planned or required by another means (e.g. Clean Streams 
Accord)? 
 
4. Did the works for improvement serve an additional purpose (e.g. stormwater 
detention)? 
Financial 
payments Were the actions already occurring or were they new? 
Purpose 
Was the compensation action primarily for avoidance or remediation purposes (e.g. 
translocation)? 
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Timing 
The numbers of requirements to be achieved prior to, concurrent with, and after 
the development were tabulated and compared. The length of time required (in 
years) for delivery of the compensation was then also determined from the 
conditions of the resource consent. 
Duration and compliance 
We assessed the number of years of specific ongoing requirements articulated in 
consents through conditions, and the frequency of requirements for an RMA bond 
to be taken under s.108 of the Act. We also considered tenure, noting where 
compensation actions were required to be carried out on land of different tenure to 
the site of ownership. We then considered more permanent mechanisms such as 
covenants, consent notices and endowment funds, noting their relative frequency 
of use and aspects of their implementation. 
Currency and ratios 
We identified where a set method was used to determine the ecological 
compensation required in each of the cases, such as a set ratio of area of habitat 
damaged to area required to compensate for that damage. 
5.4 Results 
Equivalence 
Most of the exchanges were equivalent at a high level, in that habitat loss was 
typically exchanged for habitat gain rather than for other more disparate gains 
(Table 3). ‘Domestication’ generally refers to subdivision, and is not included 
within ‘Habitat loss’ because although it sometimes resulted in habitat loss, more 
typically the subdivision was undertaken to pasture and the principle effects of the 
activity related more closely to immediate and long-term impacts of a pastoral 
environment being converted to more intensive residential development (e.g. 
increased impervious surface, noise and light disturbance). 
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Table 4. An overview of exchanges encountered in each of the 110 consents, showing 
common exchanges. 
 Principal compensation  
Principal effect Habitat gain Financial RF Financial NRF 
Domestication 34 0 0 
Habitat loss 41 3 5* 
Other 5* 1 2* 
Water take/discharge 10 5 4* 
 Total 90 9 11 
RF, ring-fenced for in-kind exchange; NRF, not ring-fenced; * out-of-kind exchange 
permitted or likely. 
There were three main forms of compensation: (1) habitat gain (whether by 
condition or extent), (2) financial payments that were designated for a purpose, or 
(3) those that were required but their destination was not specified. ‘Habitat gain’ 
refers to the creation, management or enhancement of natural areas, their legal 
protection, or a combination thereof. Riparian planting was included within this, 
and compensated for water takes and discharge consents (where compensation 
was defined) in more than half the examples (52.6%). Payments were not clearly 
ring-fenced in 11 of the cases encountered and some were difficult or impossible 
to track. The out-of-kind exchanges encountered also included funding for 
research and monitoring, and payments to agencies for other conservation actions. 
The habitat protected or managed as compensation was not necessarily similar to 
that which was removed. Rather, the most intact and best examples of remaining 
habitat on the site were subject to management actions such as supplementary 
planting of existing habitat, planting of new habitat, pest control, and fencing (i.e. 
habitat improvement). 
Spatial proximity 
Seventy-two of the 110 (65.5%) compensation requirements applied to sites that 
were on or adjacent to the site of impact, while a further 21 (19%) were required 
within 50 km of the site of impact. The remaining 17 (15.5%) were undertaken 
more than 50 km from the site of impact (Table 5). Of the offsite works 
encountered, 20 resulted from financial payments required in place of or in 
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addition to works to be undertaken on-site, where money was pooled under a 
common fund or paid directly to an agency. The spatial limit of compensation was 
usually defined by the jurisdiction of an agency, or the geographic range of a 
contestable fund or mitigation trust. 
Several exchanges involved financial contributions to pools of funding for 
conservation purposes, including mitigation trusts and endowment funds. 
Mitigation trusts are common, such as the Taranaki Tree Trust (Taranaki Regional 
Council), the Hei Tini Awa Trust (Horizons Regional Council) and the 
Turanganui a Kiwa (Gisborne District Council). Establishing a trust or fund in this 
way enables councils to access funds from private and public bodies to undertake 
wider ecological restoration programmes in association with the community, in 
addition to receiving compensation payments. Several energy generation and 
waste management companies have established these structures within their 
consents to fund a wide programme of compensation measures, usually via 
contestable funding of an agreed amount (paid annually or as a one-off payment). 
 
Table 5. Results of analysis of key implementation issues (note that more than one metric 
applies to ‘Duration and compliance’. (See Table 3 for equivalence issue.) 
Implementation issue and 
metric Variable N % 
Spatial proximity: 
Distance in kilometres 
between site of impact 
and site where ecological 
compensation was carried 
out 
0 72 65.5 
0.2–3 km 13 11.8 
3.1–10 km 1 0.9 
11–20 km 3 2.7 
21–50 km 4 3.6 
51–100 km 3 2.7 
101–200 km 9 8.2 
201–300 km 4 3.6 
301+ km 1 0.9 
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Additionality: 
Compensation actions 
encountered in case 
studies with respect to 
additionality 
Set-aside of unprotected land 38 34.5 
Set-aside of land already protected 2 1.8 
Set-aside with provision for management 33 30 
Set-aside with no management* 7 6.4 
Management actions to public land 29 26.4 
Management actions to non-public land 63 57.3 
Financial payment for new works 15 13.6 
Financial payment for works already occurring 6 5.5 
Statutory duty or responsibility 7 6.4 
Habitat creation or enhancement already 
planned 3 2.7 
Enhancement of a dual-purpose feature 20 18.2 
Actions were monitoring, avoidance or 
remediation measures 17 15.5 
Vestment to public agency to manage 10 9.1 
Timing: Time frame 
(years) for ecological 
compensation to be 
initiated or completed 
relative to the impact 
Prior 6 5.5 
Concurrent 44 40 
After 60 54.5 
Duration and 
compliance: Mechanisms 
used to secure 
compensation action 
Condition of consent, designation or consent 
order 102 92.7 
Other agreement (e.g. Memorandum of 
Understanding) 15 13.64 
Combination 8 8.8 
Duration and 
compliance: Mechanisms 
used to secure long-term 
gains 
Covenant 29 26.4 
RMA Bond (s.108) 25 22.7 
Consent notice (s.221) 13 11.8 
Vestment into reserve status 11 10.0 
Mitigation trust or endowment fund 7 6.4 
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Duration and 
compliance: Tenure of 
site of compensation 
action 
Same site, same owner 67 60.9 
Another site third party 40 36.4 
Another site same owner 3 2.7 
Duration and 
compliance: Number of 
years of required action 
following granting as 
required by consent 
None 41 37.2 
0.1–5 years 37 33.6 
6–10 years 13 11.8 
11+ years 19 17.3 
Currency and ratio: 
Evidence of a formal 
approach to quantifying 
the degree of 
compensation required 
No evidence 97 88.2 
Area 10 9.1 
SEV (Stream Ecological Valuation method) 3 2.7 
(*) No specific management refers to management actions not being prescribed in 
the consent, and does not include situations where the land is vested under a public 
agency with an existing maintenance programme. 
Additionality 
Thirty-eight (94.5%) of 40 set-asides were of land not otherwise protected, and 
included requirements for management (Table 5). Sixty-three of 110 
compensation actions occurred on private land. Seven cases included works that 
are part of the statutory duty of an agency, such as the management of an existing 
protected area administered by a council under the Reserves Act 1977. Six 
financial payments contributed to works that were already occurring, such as 
existing pest control programmes, and therefore were not additional. Most 
management actions were new works, and the majority of financial payments 
were also for works that were not otherwise planned, and so were truly additional. 
Twenty cases included compensation that fulfilled more than one purpose, such as 
the creation or enhancement of a water feature that would later be used for 
stormwater disposal, detention and treatment. Ten cases included the vesting of 
habitat in a public agency and these cases were a mix of those that required a 
degree of management to occur before handover and those that were immediately 
vested, such as extensions to existing reserves on the subject-site boundary. Seven 
actions described as compensation were not in fact compensatory actions, but 
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rather prevention of damage. These included translocation of threatened species 
from the site and retaining or restoring fish passage when diverting or obstructing 
waterways. 
Timing 
One hundred and four of 110 (94.5%) compensatory actions were required 
concurrently with the development or following its completion (Table 5). There 
were only six requirements for prior action (5.5%), and in most cases they were 
developer-driven, such as boutique subdivisions where most of the ecological 
restoration took place prior to application, for dual purposes of conservation and 
amenity. Most requirements involved the protection of extant habitat and its 
enhancement with some supplementary planting, while others involved planting 
from scratch. There was little evidence that the time lag between impact and 
compensation action (e.g. planting reaching maturity) was a factor in decision-
making. In one instance, however, an applicant was required to undertake habitat 
enhancement activities in a nearby reserve in addition to establishing the new area 
of planting. The consent assumed that enhancement works would help maintain 
habitat values in the vicinity in the 10 years until the new planting matured. 
Duration and compliance 
Compensation was usually secured by making it a condition of consent. Some 
agreements were secured by an alternative means such as a Memorandum of 
Understanding or other form of side agreement. In eight cases, both an agreement 
and a consent condition reflected the compensation requirements (Table 5). 
The gains required to meet compensation requirements were secured with 
covenants, consent notices under s.221 of the RMA, mitigation trusts and other 
endowment funds, and they included land vested with agencies for protection 
purposes. An RMA bond provides for a cash or bank-guaranteed bond to be held 
by the agency to be uplifted in the case of default. Twenty-five consents required 
that a bond be held by the agency under s.108 of the RMA (Table 5). Sixty-seven 
of 110 compensation actions (60.9%) were required to occur on the site of impact, 
while nearly all the others occur on a different site with unconnected tenure. 
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Resource consent conditions may specify a length of time within which specific 
tasks have to be carried out, such as pest management and monitoring. The mean 
number of years for continuing requirements in consents where this was stipulated 
was 11.3 with an overall median of 7.4. The figures related to years of 
management do not include outside arrangements such as covenants, which often 
require action for longer, perhaps even in perpetuity. 
Currency and ratios 
In 97 cases (88.2%) no objective metric had been applied and in 10 cases area was 
used as an informal metric of biodiversity loss. Three of the 110 consents 
reflected the application of the Stream Ecological Valuation method (Rowe et al. 
2009). 
5.5 Discussion 
Most exchanges are undertaken between broadly similar values, and habitat 
improvement and set-asides are by far the most common means of compensating 
for ecological harm. Many cases where financial contributions had been sought 
left open the possibility of a significantly unlike exchange. Although out-of-kind 
exchanges are becoming more common around the world there is a lack of tools 
or guidelines for decision-making for unlike exchanges (McKenney & Kiesecker, 
2010). If New Zealand follows the rest of the world in the increasing frequency of 
out-of-kind exchanges, methods and decision support tools will be needed if 
compensation is to be quantified and objectively determined. 
The majority (77.3%) of compensation requirements were carried out within 3 km 
of the site where the loss occurred, but many occurred much further away. If off-
site compensation becomes more common, a lack of a formal framework in which 
to manage exchanges will be limiting. By contrast, many jurisdictions around the 
world orchestrate exchanges of biodiversity more systematically through large-
scale operations (e.g. US wetland mitigation banking; Burgin 2010; BenDor & 
Riggsbee 2011). Uncontrolled off-site compensation could lead to an expansion of 
low quality ‘restored’ habitat in the place of destroyed high quality habitat. Macro-
scale landscape changes cannot be detected with piecemeal methods (BenDor & 
Riggsbee 2011). Most instances of compensation at a distance were enabled by 
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mitigation trusts. The use of mitigation trusts has potential advantages, but care is 
required in drafting project eligibility requirements. We noted significant variation 
in the deeds and other governing criteria for trusts, with some having very specific 
requirements related to the key general principles for use of the funds. 
Compensation was typically required during or after a development, although best 
practice typically calls for implementation in advance to reduce risks to 
ecosystems and species (McKenney & Kiesecker 2010; Gardner & von Hase 2012; 
Pilgrim et al. 2013). The few examples of prior requirements is likely due in part 
to a lack of formal mechanisms to recognise prior works. In two cases there was 
clear evidence in background documents that the agencies involved were reluctant 
to accept that the works are additional if they are undertaken in advance and 
outside the consent process. Some types of consents, such as subdivisions, provide 
an opportunity to tie some achievements to the release of the s.224C certificate 
(certification that confirms that the conditions of subdivision consent have been 
met, issued by a city or district council), but most consents issued under the RMA 
(e.g. land use consents) have no such option. 
Compared with many other jurisdictions, New Zealand landowners and agencies 
face few statutory requirements as regards ecological management. Habitat 
improvements such as weed and pest management or fencing of streams, wetlands 
or lake are typically a decision of the landowner. Therefore, most new 
management actions to habitat on private land in New Zealand are considered 
additional, owing to an absence of a minimum standard of land management and 
alternative statutory means for compelling actions such as pest control. 
Active management of protected areas in New Zealand is critically important to 
the persistence of the biodiversity values. New Zealand has a large portion of land 
protected for the primary purpose of conservation at 8 763 300 hectares or 33.4% 
of the total land area (Ministry for the Environment 2010). Funding for the 
management of protected areas is typically constrained, however, and there is an 
absence of quantifiable and time-bound goals for biodiversity management (Green 
& Clarkson 2005). 
Compensation payments can result in planned works being carried out sooner than 
expected. For example, if a council uses a compensation payment to fund a 
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planting project, the advancement of the work can increase the additionality of the 
gain. Of critical importance to assessing additionality, particularly on public land, 
is that compensation requirements do not simply result in cost-shifting 
(Christensen 2008). Cost-shifting is when compensation payments displace other 
funding used for a given conservation purpose. 
Duration and compliance is of concern in New Zealand, as recent research has 
found that many compensation requirements are not met (Brown et al. 2013). 
Most compensation requirements (70.9%) cease within 5 years – usually 
specifying an expectation of the end of agency monitoring and oversight, 
particularly where there is no corresponding agency monitoring regime for 
covenants or consent notices (which is commonly the case). Compensation 
requirements are usually expressed as conditions of consent, while a range of 
other mechanisms are used to secure those actions including RMA bonds, 
covenants and mitigation trusts. 
The most basic form of security is robust conditions that set clear and detailed 
requirements, set out in an enforceable document such as a consent or side 
agreement referred to in that consent, designation, or a consent order. The 
likelihood of securing any given compensation requirement, and to enforce it in 
the case of default, diminishes with increasing ambiguity of stated requirements. 
In some cases, conditions that had been negotiated were not actually included in 
the consent itself, omitting a clear legal mandate for the consent holder to 
undertake the works (Marshall 2001). This is of serious concern, because the 
conditions represent the key means of ensuring that the adverse effects of the 
activity are avoided, remedied, or mitigated (Ministry for the Environment 2001). 
The research also revealed significant issues with the security measures that are 
imposed to ensure compensation works occur. Covenants and consent notices 
were commonly used but very few agencies appear to have a formal means of 
recording and archiving them in a way that ensures their regular monitoring and 
evaluation. We also noted that the use of endowment funds or mitigation trusts 
was becoming common, particularly in large projects where there is a wide range 
of effects. However, our research showed that more than half of the financial 
payments required as compensation had indeterminate ends, meaning that they 
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might or are likely to result in out-of-kind exchanges, potentially leading to 
ongoing environmental losses. 
We encountered few instances of quantification or standardised methods of 
compensation assessment. The level of compensation seems to have been 
determined primarily by the resourcing by and willingness of the applicant, and 
the council specifying and insisting on a minimum standard. Financial payments 
were typically determined via negotiation, rather than an objective assessment of 
the magnitude of effects, or against a consistent and transparent cost scale. 
In the recent case of Transmission Gully, a project involving the extension of a 
road through significant habitat, the quantification of the offset through an 
‘environmental compensation ratio’ was discussed. The Court noted that ratios 
would be ‘always a subject of debate’, and that the final determination of 
appropriate mitigation was reasonably the domain of the judiciary and not any one 
method (Environmental Protection Authority 2011). 
5.6 Conclusion 
Ecological compensation is an increasingly common mechanism around the world, 
which has the potential to significantly contribute both to ameliorating the impacts 
of continued development and augmenting wider conservation efforts. Our review 
of process and consent variables suggests that the consideration and 
implementation of ecological compensation in New Zealand is noticeably ad hoc. 
Therefore, ecological compensation as it is presently implemented is unlikely to 
achieve environmental protection goals. 
It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of ecological compensation without 
strategic and consent-specific goals for ecological compensation. Unambiguous 
goals are needed to specify what compensatory mechanisms are to achieve, what 
types are acceptable in what situations, and when ecological compensation is 
unlikely to be appropriate. Goals should be measurable, such that, in time, a 
quantitative analysis can be undertaken on the implementation of these 
mechanisms in New Zealand. Increased emphasis upon monitoring and 
compliance by agencies is also necessary such that instances of default can be 
identified and rectified as soon as possible. We conclude that the application of 
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ecological compensation under the RMA in New Zealand requires significant 
improvement if the ongoing erosion of the natural capital upon which our 
prosperity and economy ultimately depends is to be slowed and reversed. 
Ecological compensation remains a catalyst for creating greater synergies between 
ecological and economic interests, but the successful implementation of the 
concept is some way off. 
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Chapter 6  
Implementing ecological compensation: 
stakeholder perspectives and a way 
forward
3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Abstract  
Ecological compensation is widely used and often criticised for promulgating 
poor outcomes for biodiversity. There is a lack of systematic research on 
ecological compensation, and to date limited research globally into the 
perspectives of the various stakeholders involved. We undertook 116 semi-
structured interviews with practitioners working with ecological compensation in 
New Zealand. Participants consider that benefits to biodiversity are the chief 
attraction of ecological compensation (49.2% of all responses), with the 
                                                 
3
 Chapter 6 has been published in the Journal of the Royal Society of New Zealand as 
“Implementing ecological compensation – stakeholder perspectives and a way forward” (2014)  by 
M A Brown, B D Clarkson, B J Barton and C Joshi (in press) 
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disadvantages mainly relating to the difficulties of practical implementation of the 
concept. Our results also show that 96.5% of participants support the concept fully 
or to a limited extent and most (83%) of participants consider that it contributes to 
sustainable management with significant support (87.9%) for a statutory approach.  
Formal statutory guidance at a national level in New Zealand and an increased 
focus upon follow-up and monitoring is considered likely to generate more robust 
exchanges. 
6.2 Introduction 
Ecological compensation is a practice where the negative effects of development 
are sought to be offset by positive environmental activity, either on the same site, 
or on one nearby. The concept has its roots in ‘planning gain’ mechanisms 
introduced in the 1960s in the United Kingdom and in US wetland mitigation 
banking programmes arising from the introduction of the Clean Water Act 1972 
(ten Kate et al. 2004; Whatmore & Boucher 1993). In the context of ecological 
compensation, development is considered allowable if the losses of natural capital 
can be adequately counter-balanced (Cowell 1997). However, globally concern is 
growing that the various means of compensating for ecological damage are failing 
to meet their goals, and that a lack of monitoring is obscuring on-going 
biodiversity losses and confounding accountability (Burgin 2008; Gibbons & 
Lindenmayer 2007; Villarroya & Puig 2010; Walker 2010). In addition to 
concerns that ecological compensation is being poorly implemented, fundamental 
issues with the fungibility of biodiversity exist. Many commentators highlight that 
the degree to which natural systems are bartered places them at risk of degradation 
and extinction, as the capacity and methods to do so may be beyond current 
knowledge levels of ecological science and restoration  (Bull et al. 2013; Burgin 
2008; Salzman & Ruhl 2000; Walker et al. 2009a). 
The ad hoc nature of the application of ecological compensation in New Zealand 
has previously drawn criticism from several commentators (Memon & Skelton 
2004; Memon et al. 2004; Turner 2000) who note that the policy vacuum and 
inconsistent decision-making is likely having deleterious impacts on the 
environment. Some regional plans and policy statements make reference to 
compensatory mechanisms, including biodiversity offsetting, but the majority of 
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cases proceed with limited guidance or policy being applied. Some commentators 
in New Zealand and around the world suggest that more formal consideration of 
ecological compensation is likely to improve consistency and quality of 
implementation (Faith & Walker 2002; McKenney & Kiesecker 2010; Memon & 
Skelton 2004; Race & Fonseca 1996; Rega 2013; Rubec & Hanson 2009). There 
has yet to be a systematic collection of views on the matter: a niche this research 
intends to fill.  
Studies worldwide point to the important role that government agency staff and 
other actors play in influencing the performance and outcomes of any consent 
planning process, and in revealing complexities of a given issue or system 
(Carruthers & Neis 2011; Salzman & Ruhl 2000). The purpose of this research 
was to gain an understanding of how the concept of ecological compensation is 
being and could be used in New Zealand, by surveying those who regularly 
encounter the concept in either a professional or a voluntary capacity. Similar 
programmes of survey and interview of practitioners in relation to ecological 
compensation and related policy matters have contributed to improved 
understanding of complex concepts overseas (see (Carruthers & Neis 2011; Hayes 
& Morrison-Saunders 2007; Kaplowitz et al. 2008; Murphy 2006; Rijke et al. 
2013; ten Kate et al. 2004) and a New Zealand-based study was considered to be 
important as the practice increases domestically. When discussing a single 
concept with a range of stakeholders, only part of the analysis lies in the 
aggregation of responses. It is necessary to consider and reflect divergent views 
among sector groups such as business people, agency staff and non-vested 
conservation interests, because different players in any ecological compensation 
case will have different and potentially opposing objectives (Burgin 2010; 
Kaplowitz et al. 2008; Murphy 2006; ten Kate et al. 2004; Walker et al. 2009a).  
Specifically, the present research sought to answer the following key questions: 
 What are the views of stakeholders on the implementation of 
ecological compensation in New Zealand, under the Resource 
Management Act (RMA) 1991? 
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 What are the views of stakeholders on the way ecological 
compensation could be addressed on a formal basis in New 
Zealand? 
 Is there evidence of divergence in views across the different sectors 
represented in the sample, and what might be the basis of that 
divergence? 
6.3 Methods 
Participant selection  
Participants for the interview research were identified purposefully. Invitations to 
participate in the research were distributed through major professional 
organisations including the New Zealand Ecological Society, the New Zealand 
Planning Institute and the Resource Management Law Association. When contact 
was made by respondents, a time for a phone-based or face-to-face interview was 
determined. The self-selection approach may influence the sector composition but 
the number and breadth of responses received is considered adequate to address 
the key research questions posed. Questions were not provided to participants in 
advance of the interviews.  
Interview method 
We elected to use semi-structured interviews conducted with key informants to 
gather our data. Interviews are particularly useful for obtaining the story behind a 
participant’s experiences, because they can pursue in-depth information around a 
topic more effectively than closed-response questionnaires (Kaplowitz et al. 2008).  
Key-informant interviews are an established technique for capturing critical 
viewpoints of stakeholders involved in a specific issue (Clare et al. 2011; 
Tremblay 1957). Semi-structured interviews were considered to be the optimal 
method of interviewing when compared with others because, although they are 
time-consuming, they provide a flexible and effective means of obtaining detailed 
information (Kaplowitz et al. 2008). Using a combination of standard open 
response and closed fixed-value responses, a specific topic or area of expertise can 
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be thoroughly canvassed, with participants selected based on their knowledge or 
familiarity with the topic (Tremblay 1957). Categorical responses and the use of 
thematic and content analysis also enables statistical representation of aggregated 
responses, which is of use in demonstrating dominant viewpoints. 
Interviews were predominantly conducted over the phone so that participation in 
the study would be accessible to people from around New Zealand. Face-to-face 
interviews were possible on request or if persons were passing through Hamilton 
City, where the research was based. Interviews were undertaken between the 7
th
 of 
June and the 29
th
 of August 2011 and lasted for between 18 minutes and 2 hours 
and 45 minutes, with a mean interview time of 46 minutes. The questions were 
standardised and all but one were asked of all participants (see supplementary 
material). The answers to the open-response questions were recorded in 
summarised note form by one interviewer. Participants were able to decline to 
respond to any of the questions. The interviews were conducted within the 
guidelines of the University of Waikato Human Ethics Research Committee 
[Approval #FSEN7/10].  
Interview questions 
The interview began with an informal discussion in which participants were asked 
to define ecological compensation. All participants were able to provide an 
appropriate definition and many asked questions to clarify that both interviewer 
and interviewee were discussing the same concept. Participants were then asked to 
give examples of the types of actions that could be considered ecological 
compensation, and all were able to provide several examples. This exercise, 
although the data was not formally analysed and presented, was a helpful 
introduction and assisted in clarifying the topic at hand.   
The interview was divided into three key parts; collection of basic information 
including the sector in which the participant was most engaged; matters that were 
of specific relevance to implementation of ecological compensation; and matters 
relating to policy treatment and future means of addressing the concept in law and 
practice (Table 1). The questions were not asked under these headings, but 
flexibly to facilitate the flow of conversation, in the typical style of a semi-
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structured interview. The structure and questions in the order in which they were 
asked are available as supplementary material. 
Table 1: Questions that were analysed grouped under two main themes of the interview 
Question 
Implementation 
What are the potential advantages or positive aspects of ecological compensation?  
What are the potential disadvantages, negatives or risks of ecological compensation?  
What are the barriers to successful implementation of ecological compensation?   
What key considerations do you make in establishing the appropriateness of a compensation option?  
A way forward 
To what extent do you support the use of ecological compensation under the RMA? 
How important is it that exchanges are 'like-for-like'? 
Should formal provision for ecological compensation be statutory as opposed to non-statutory? 
Which of the following legal tool/method would be the most appropriate to deliver this policy? 
Would you consider it appropriate for policy or guidance to contain set methods for determining 
compensation? 
What matters do you consider national level guidance should address? 
Does ecological compensation as a concept contribute to sustainable management? 
 
The implementation questions were designed to draw on the participant’s 
assessment of ecological compensation (advantages, disadvantages and barriers to 
implementation) and what they saw that having that option available meant 
compared with a context where such an option was not available. The next 
question provided the chance to record what the key elements were that 
practitioners noted in assessing a situation in which compensation had been 
proposed. The final question considered stakeholder perspectives on the critically 
important issue of similarity of exchange. All of these questions enabled areas of 
critical focus to be revealed in addressing the issues with ecological compensation.  
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The second set of questions related to the level of support for ecological 
compensation, how the participants viewed the concept, and its current and 
potential place in resource management in New Zealand. A series of questions 
were designed to glean views on how ecological compensation might be better 
addressed in the future, based on discussions in the New Zealand literature to date 
(Christensen 2007; Christensen 2008; Christensen 2012; Memon & Skelton 2004; 
Memon et al. 2004; Norton 2007; Norton 2008; Turner 2000; Walker et al. 2009b). 
Most were subject to a combination of thematic and content analysis as described 
below, although the answers to the questions prompting any ‘other suggestions for 
improvement’ and ‘any other comments’ were recorded and common statements 
extracted that were not otherwise addressed by the analysis. 
Analysis 
Questions that had binary or categorical responses were analysed in aggregate to 
determine dominant perspectives.  Those that had open responses were subject to 
thematic analysis. Thematic analysis is the grouping of responses to open-ended 
questions which run along similar themes, so help aggregate a large body of 
information into an array of dominant outcomes after Braun & Clarke (2006). We 
employed this technique of analysis due to its flexibility and capacity to reveal 
trends and ideas not necessarily captured in existing literature (Braun & Clarke 
2006). Following the establishment of the key themes, content analysis was 
applied that recorded the frequency of occurrence of themes, enabling quantitative 
analysis to be undertaken to infer relative importance of the themes. In a similar 
manner to Seabrook-Davison (2008), the five most frequently occurring themes 
were listed in rank order. We analysed for significant discrepancies between the 
broad trend and the perspectives of sectors using the Chi squared test where data 
were sufficient to do so (Agresti 1996).  
6.4 Results 
The response rate to our interview programme was higher than expected, with 125 
respondents significantly exceeding the target number of 40. Of the 125 people 
who responded, 116 progressed through to interview. Nine did not progress to 
interview, mainly due to time availability. The participants came from a variety of 
backgrounds and were identified based on their current sector of employment or 
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interest (Table 2). Our third key question related to divergence of views across 
sectors and this is addressed below in response to each interview question. We 
also direct readers to the supplementary material which includes the raw response 
data across sectors for the open-ended questions, as this information provides 
greater detail on the responses of participants and the differences that can be 
observed among sectors. 
Table 2: Table showing sector distribution of participants in semi-structured interviews 
(total = 116) 
Sector Total Consultant Local Govt Reg Govt Central Govt Research 
Consent Planning 12 2 1 8 1 
 Policy Advisory 9 1 2 5 1 
 Environmental 
other 69 28 3 18 6 14 
Advocacy/NGO 5 
     Business 15 
     Law 6      
 
Participants were not identifiable by name in the analysis and information such as 
gender and ethnicity were not collected. The main defining piece of information 
collected was the sector with which the respondent identified for employment or 
interest purposes. While most of the categories are self-explanatory, the 
‘Environmental other’ should be considered as including those that work in the 
environmental sector but do not occupy a position in policy or planning. This was 
comprised mainly of ecologists, nearly half of which worked for private 
consulting firms. Participants were asked to provide two key pieces of background 
information in addition to the nature of their current position (sector type): (1) the 
numbers of relevant years of work experience, and (2) an indication of their self-
rated level of knowledge of ecological compensation on a scale of 1 (very little 
knowledge) to 4 (strong knowledge) with the description of the categories detailed 
verbally. The majority of participants (81%) had more than ten years relevant 
work experience, spanning the sectors mentioned above, with the remainder 
equally split (9.5% each) into 5-10 years of work experience, and less than 5 years.  
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Nearly half (48.3% of participants ranked their knowledge at the level of 3, 
followed by 27.6% rating their own knowledge at the level of 4. A smaller group 
(20.7%) rated themselves as a ‘2’ while just four placed themselves in the lowest 
knowledge category of 1. The dominant profile of an individual participant is 
therefore an experienced professional with a relatively good understanding of 
ecological compensation. They all clearly demonstrated knowledge and 
experience of the concept and its application. 
What are the views of stakeholders on the implementation of ecological 
compensation in New Zealand, under the RMA 1991? 
Advantages 
Across all sectors, the most commonly cited advantage of ecological 
compensation was the benefits to biodiversity through an overall reduction in 
ecological effects, with more than half of all responses to this question coming 
under that theme (Table 3). 
Table 3: Most frequent response to the advantages of ecological compensation 
Rank Theme % 
1 Reducing the impacts of development and resulting in biodiversity benefits* 49.2 
2 Integration of environmental considerations in development 20.4 
3 Stakeholder benefits 8.8 
4 Allows development to proceed 8.2 
5 Communication and relationship building (social outcomes) 6.0 
(*) Denotes that this theme was dominant across all sectors 
 
For example, one participant noted: “It [ecological compensation] works best 
when we are hostile to the destruction of primary habitat”. This and many other 
similar comments noted that giving the environment primacy was the chief 
attraction of the concept. The benefits to biodiversity were followed by the 
advantage of seeing environmental concerns better integrated in the consideration 
of development proposals. The fourth most common response (8.2% of 
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participants) noted the concept enabled development not otherwise possible to 
proceed on the basis of compensation being provided.  
Disadvantages 
Responses to the disadvantages were more divergent than advantages and 
rankings were more different among the sectors (see supplementary material). The 
disadvantages overall primarily related to the difficulties and inefficiencies in 
managing the concept, rather than shortcomings of the concept itself (Table 4).  
Table 4: Most frequent response to the disadvantages of ecological compensation 
Rank Theme % 
1 Poor security of exchange 15.3 
1 Lack of transparency and misuse of the concept 15.3 
3 Lack of guidance, policy and tools 14.6 
4 Additional pressure on biodiversity 13.5 
5 Poorly planned exchanges 10.5 
 
Equally ranked as the most commonly-cited disadvantages were poor security of 
exchanges and the misappropriation of the concept; closely followed by concern 
at the lack of guidance. Concern that biodiversity is placed under additional 
pressure ranked fourth, followed by concerns regarding poor planning of 
exchanges. 
Barriers 
Four of the five barriers identified, like the disadvantages, concerns related to the 
difficulties and inefficiencies in managing the concept (Table 5). Ecological 
limitations constituted 8.5% of responses. 
 
 
 
119 
 
Table 5: Most frequent response to the barriers to the implementation of ecological 
compensation 
Rank Theme % 
1 Lack of guidance, tools and a framework for decision-making * 20.1 
2 Lack of follow-up and security 14.8 
3 Agency and operational failures 13.0 
4 Lack of willingness, resourcing and priority 11.4 
5 Ecological limitations 8.5 
(*) Denotes that this theme was dominant across all sectors 
 
Of dominant concern was the lack of guidance and policy across all sectors, 
followed by lack of security and agency and operational failures. Ecological 
limitations concerned responses that considered that some elements of ecosystems 
cannot be replaced and some effects cannot be ameliorated by current knowledge 
and tools. 
Key considerations 
Participants indicated that the key matter they considered in evaluating ecological 
compensation was that the exchange was fair and appropriate, followed by the 
significance of the biodiversity being impacted (Table 6). 
Table 6: Frequency of response for each category on key considerations made in establishing 
the appropriateness of a compensation option 
Rank Theme % 
1 Fair and appropriate exchange 26.6 
2 The significance of the biodiversity being impacted 25.0 
3 Monitoring, security and follow-up provisions 14.8 
4 Strategic conservation gain 11.4 
5 Ecological limitations 6.2 
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This reflected the sentiment for the previous question, where several participants 
noted that if the exchange was poor to begin with, the implementation was 
unimportant as the ecological loss was inevitable. Perceptions of the fairness and 
appropriateness of exchanges no doubt vary, but the unifying contention is that 
the effects must be meaningfully addressed by the compensation as the gateway 
test. The ability to secure the provisions was again a significant matter of interest, 
while the strategic opportunities to contribute to wider conservation goals was 
next important, followed by ecological limitations at fifth. The matters 
participants considered in assessing proposals of ecological compensation 
strongly echoed those matters perceived to be the chief areas of concern. The 
recognition that getting those key elements right may signal an improvement that 
is actually occuring, or at least imminent, in the quality of vetting of ecological 
compensation proposals. 
What are the views of stakeholders on the way ecological compensation could 
be addressed in the future? 
Support for ecological compensation 
Participants were asked the extent to which they supported the concept of 
ecological compensation and its actual or potential contribution to resource 
management (Table 7). A significant majority (70.7%) fully supported the concept 
and a higher proportion supported it in each group compared with those that 
support only limited use of the concept. A further 30 participants (25.8%) 
supported the concept, but consider that its use should be limited. Only two 
participants were ambivalent to ecological compensation being available or did 
not support it outright, while two did not respond. When the two outlier 
respondents were excluded from the Chi-squared analysis among the sectors the 
level of support for ecological compensation between those that ‘support limited 
use and those that generally support it was significantly different (χ2 = 16.765, DF 
= 6, P-Value = 0.010). This suggests that some groups are more tentative in their 
support of the concept but do overall support its presence as a policy tool. 
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Table 7 Frequency and percentages (in brackets) of response for each category of support 
for ecological compensation 
Question 
Planning 
& 
Policy 
n=21 
Enviro 
consult 
n=28 
Enviro 
govt 
n=27 
Enviro 
research 
n=14 
Advocacy 
n=5 
Business 
n=15 
Law 
n=6 
Total 
n=116 
Do not support 0 0 1 (3.7) 0 0 0 0 1 
Neutral 0 0 0 1 (7.1) 0 0 0 1 
Support but 
use should be 
very limited 3 (14.3) 
8 
(28.6) 
11 
(40.7) 6 (42.9) 2 (40.0) 0 0 
30 
(25.8) 
Generally 
support 
18 
(85.7) 
20 
(71.4) 
14 
(51.9) 7 (50.0) 2 (40.0) 
15 
(100.0) 
6 
(100.0) 
82 
(70.7) 
No response 0 0 1 (3.7) 0 1 (20.0) 0 0 2 
 
The importance of like-for-like exchanges 
'Like for like' exchange of values is one of the key premises of ecological 
compensation. The majority of participants (67.2%) noted that it was very 
important but that flexibility was needed, with just 4.3% regarding it as non-
negotiable (Table 8). Only two participants considered it unimportant, with the 
remainder regarding it as somewhat important. There was no significant 
difference across sector responses (χ2= 11.669, DF = 6, P-Value = 0.070). Where 
participants entered into further detail about situations in which flexibility was 
appropriate, interview notes reflect that they were typically referring only to cases 
of ‘trading-up’, whereby areas of greater conservation significance are put aside 
or managed in place of less valuable areas that are impacted in the course of the 
development.  
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Table 8: Frequency and percentages (in brackets) of response for each category on scale of 
the importance of like for like 
Like for Like 
Planni
ng & 
Policy 
n=21 
Enviro 
consult 
n=28 
Enviro 
govt 
n=27 
Enviro 
researc
h n=14 
Advoc
acy 
n=5 
Busine
ss 
n=15 
Law  
n=6 
Total 
n=116 
Not important 1 (4.8) 0 0 0 0 1 (6.7) 0 
2 
(1.78) 
Somewhat 
important 2 (9.5) 8 (28.6) 4 (14.8) 8 (57.1) 
1 
(20.0) 
5 
(33.3) 
3 
(50.0) 
31 
(26.7) 
Very important 
17 
(81.0) 
19 
(67.9) 
21 
(77.8) 6 (42.9) 
4 
(80.0) 
8 
(53.3) 
3 
(50.0) 
78 
(67.2) 
Non-negotiable 1 (4.8) 1 (3.6) 2 (7.4) 0 0 1 (6.7) 0 5 (4.3) 
 
Future policy direction  
The questions in this section inquired whether there was a need for a statutory 
approach, what an appropriate legal tool might be to use, and whether the 
resulting guidelines ought to include reference to prescribed methods for 
determining the quantum of compensation (Table 9). All groups, and the majority 
within all sectors, strongly favoured statutory methods to address ecological 
compensation, with three not responding and 11 suggesting a non-statutory 
approach is more appropriate. The categories of possible legal tools (National 
Policy Statement, National Environmental Standard, other RMA method or 
separate legislation) were provided to participants, with most choosing a National 
Environmental Standard as the most appropriate legal tool to address ecological 
compensation. The second most common response was that of the participant not 
being sure or stating no preference, followed by opting for a National Policy 
Statement to address the matter. However all three categories of National 
Environmental Standard, ‘unsure’ and National Policy Statement were similar in 
response frequency. 
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Table 9 Frequency and percentages (in brackets) of responses to questions regarding future 
direction and policy 
Question 
Planning 
& 
Policy 
n=21 
Enviro 
consult 
n=28 
Enviro 
govt 
n=27 
Enviro 
research 
n=14 
Advocacy 
n=5 
Business 
n=15 
Law  
n=6 
Total 
n=116 
Do you support ecological compensation being addressed with a statutory 
approach? 
   
No 2 (9.5) 2 (7.1) 2 (7.4) 1 (7.1) 0 2 (13.3) 
2 
(33.3) 
11 
(9.5) 
Yes 
19 
(90.5) 
25 
(89.3) 
24 
(88.9) 
12 
(85.7) 5 (100.0) 
13 
(86.7) 
4 
(66.7) 
102 
(87.9) 
No response 0 1 (3.6) 1 (3.7) 1 (7.1) 0 0 0 3 (2.6) 
What is the most appropriate legal method to address ecological 
compensation? 
   
NPS 7 (33.3) 
9 
(32.1) 
10 
(37.0) 1 (7.1) 2 (40.0) 3 (20.0) 
1 
(16.7) 
33 
(28.4) 
NES 9 (42.9) 
10 
(35.7) 
6 
(22.2) 4 (28.6) 3 (60.0) 7 (46.7) 
3 
(50.0) 
42 
(36.2) 
Other RMA 
method 0 
3 
(10.7) 0 1 (7.1) 0 3 (20.0) 0 7 (6.0) 
Separate 
legislation 0 0 2 (7.4) 0 0 0 0 2 (1.7) 
NR 5 (23.8) 
6 
(21.4) 
9 
(33.3) 8 (57.1) 0 2 (13.3) 
2 
(33.3) 
32 
(27.6) 
Should future policy include set methods for determining ecological 
compensation? 
   
No 
13 
(61.9) 
18 
(64.3) 
8 
(29.6) 7 (50.0) 1 (20.0) 5 (33.3) 
4 
(66.7) 
56 
(48.3) 
Yes 8 (38.1) 
9 
(32.1) 
18 
(66.7) 6 (42.9) 3 (60.0) 
10 
(66.7) 
2 
(33.3) 
56 
(48.3) 
No response 0 1 (3.6) 1 (3.7) 1 (7.1) 1 (20.0) 0 0 4 (3.4) 
(NPS = National Policy Statement;  NES = National Environmental Standard – both policy 
tools available to provide guidance and/or rules at a national level on matters of national 
significance. NR = no response.) 
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Whether or not set methods or prescribed decision-support tools should be 
provided to calculate ecological compensation is perhaps where some of the most 
striking divergence between sectors was present. Of the total number of 
respondents, four did not give a response to this question, while the remainder 
were evenly split (56/56) over whether they considered set methods to be 
appropriate. Most that responded ‘no’ to set methods voiced concern that the field 
is moving so quickly that such methods would likely soon become outdated. 
There was a clear distinction between the perceived appropriateness across the 
sectors. Environmental Government and Business participants mainly selected 
‘yes’, while Planning & Policy, Environmental Consultants mainly selected ‘no’ 
to set methods. The remainder of groups demonstrated a more event split or a low 
n value. Despite some evidence of divergence in the raw counts, a Chi-squared 
analysis reflected no statistically significant difference (χ2 = 11.447, DF = 6, P-
Value = 0.076). 
Guidance content 
The proposed content of guidance addressed both high level principles and 
detailed operational guidance (Table 10). Practitioners highlighted the need for 
guidance to be explicit and principle-based and to be standardised across the 
country. They noted that it should include tools and methods, it should be scalable 
and it should include standards for follow-up and security. Further – and perhaps 
contradictory to a push for standardisation – there was a clear desire that the 
guidance material be flexible, scalable and open to modification as new tools and 
knowledge became available. 
Table 10: Frequency of response for each category on content of future guidance and policy 
Rank Theme % 
1 Clear and unambiguous policy direction based on key principles * 27.5 
2 Standardised decision-making framework 19.0 
3 Tools, methods and guidance on expected level of information 15.2 
4 Standards for follow-up and security 9.1 
5 Flexible, open to innovation and use at different scales 8.7 
(*) Denotes that this theme was dominant across all sectors 
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Sustainable management 
The majority (71.5%) of respondents agreed that ecological compensation 
contributes to sustainable management, with a further 19% (total of 90.5%) 
suggesting that it does so ‘somewhat’ (Table 11). There was also no statistically 
significant difference (χ2 = 9.035, DF = 6, P-Value = 0.172) among the sectors 
with the great majority of respondents considering that ecological compensation 
contributes to sustainable management. 
Table 11 Frequency and percentages (in brackets) of response for each category of the extent 
to which ecological compensation contributes to sustainable management 
  
Planning 
& 
Policy 
n=21 
Enviro 
consult 
n=28 
Enviro 
govt 
n=27 
Enviro 
research 
n=14 
Advocacy 
n=5 
Business 
n=15 
Law  
n=6 
Total 
n=116 
No 0 1 (3.6) 8 (29.6) 0 0 1 (6.7) 0 10 
Somewhat 4 (19.0) 3 (10.7) 5 (18.5) 4 (28.6) 1 (20.0) 3 (20.0) 2 (33.3) 22 
Yes 
17 
(81.0) 
24 
(85.7) 
14 
(51.9) 
10 
(71.4) 3 (60.0) 
11 
(73.3) 4 (66.7) 83 
No response 0 0 0 0 1 (20.0) 0 0 1 
 
Other matters 
The open-ended summary questions prompting further ideas for improvement of 
the implementation of ecological compensation, as well as the section for ‘any 
other comments’ allowed participants to raise matters not otherwise addressed. 
Twenty-two participants did not have any further ideas for improvement, while 
many more reiterated matters already addressed elsewhere in the questionnaire 
(such as the need for guidance). Of the matters not otherwise addressed, poor 
agency oversight was most frequently mentioned (16), followed by the 
importance of increasing the capacity of agencies to administer the concept (14). 
It is clear that many participants are concerned with the resourcing and capacity of 
agencies, and consider that this must be addressed in order to improve 
implementation. In addition, nine participants identified the opportunity presented 
to New Zealand by bio-banking, enabling the aggregation of mitigation funding 
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into a credit scheme, while a further seven noted that ecological compensation 
would generate the best outcomes if integrated with systematic conservation 
planning.  
6.5 Discussion 
This research provides insight into the knowledge and experience of a significant 
number and wide range of stakeholders involved in ecological compensation in 
New Zealand. Studies overseas note difficulty in engaging with the regulatory 
community due to a lack of availability (BenDor & Riggsbee 2011) and low 
participation by practitioners and the business sector due to the potential negative 
consequences of research (Carruthers & Neis 2011). However we found 
significant and unexpectedly high willingness to participate in the research and 
from all sectors. This is perhaps symptomatic of the rapid development of the 
field in New Zealand and of an appetite for greater discussion and analysis of this 
concept. In the context of economic recession and an ongoing need for 
development and resource use, there is also global interest in these mechanisms 
due to their potential to help resolve the binary of economic development and 
environmental protection.  
What are the views of stakeholders on the implementation of ecological 
compensation in New Zealand, under the RMA 1991? 
The principal advantages of the concept, particularly the two most commonly 
identified, were eco-centric and related to the better achievement of biodiversity 
and environmental benefits. Strikingly, however, ecological matters featured 
comparatively little in the discussion of disadvantages and barriers – most of 
which were confined to operational matters. This indicates that although the 
potential ecological benefits of the concept are well-recognised, the scientific 
shortcomings of it are considered minor compared with the organisational and 
social impediments (contextual challenges) to effective implementation. This 
contention reflects findings overseas that addressing contextual challenges such as 
by increasing follow-up and enforcement are necessary to generate better 
outcomes from ecological compensation (Bull et al. 2013; Cowell 2000; Gibbons 
& Lindenmayer 2007; Rega 2013; Walker et al. 2009a). 
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What are the views of stakeholders on the way ecological compensation could 
be addressed on a formal basis in New Zealand? 
The interviews demonstrated a strong endorsement of ecological compensation. 
Most respondents acknowledged that it was conceptually sound and a valid tool of 
resource management. This level of support reflects similar studies that also show 
significant support for the concept, albeit tempered by ever-present concerns 
about practical implementation (Gibbons & Lindenmayer 2007; Hayes & 
Morrison-Saunders 2007; Memon & Skelton 2004; Murphy 2006; Rubec & 
Hanson 2009). The concept was clearly viewed as an improved approach to past 
environmental management, which was considered less likely to restrict adverse 
effects both in degree and location: 
“It [ecological compensation] is the way of the future, the only sensible 
thing to do. If you are against ecological compensation, then you must 
interrogate why...because that is admitting things cannot improve” 
(Interview 8) 
Like for like 
Responses to our interview question regarding the importance of like-for-like 
exchanges reflected that although similarity of exchange was seen as important, it 
is by no means ‘non-negotiable’. Respondents attitudes to the importance of like-
for-like reflects other studies which have shown that the like-for-like approach is 
viewed as one that may not be workable in practice and does not always generate 
the best outcomes (Hayes & Morrison-Saunders 2007; McKenney & Kiesecker 
2010). The recognition of the importance of flexibility in applying like-for-like is 
also in general accordance with current perspectives which are increasingly 
providing for priority-based exchanges (McKenney & Kiesecker 2010). Of 
practical concern however is how the suitability of like-for-unlike exchanges is 
determined. While work is being undertaken on developing methods for 
comparing unlike exchanges, one has yet been accepted into common usage in 
New Zealand (Overton et al. 2013; Quertier & Lavorel 2011).  
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Formalising approaches 
Most participants were of the view that a policy vacuum was a significant 
contributor to ineffectual outcomes of ecological compensation, which reflects 
assertions in the literature that further and more robust treatments of the concept 
would reduce repetitive litigation, achieving greater consistency within and 
between agencies, and improve implementation (Bekessy et al. 2010; Memon & 
Skelton 2004; Race & Fonseca 1996; Rega 2013). Addressing how the concept 
may be addressed in national level policy and guidance would seem to be the next 
significant challenge for New Zealand. Participants strongly favoured a statutory 
approach but held very mixed perspectives as to whether it would be appropriate 
for prescribed set methods to be set in policy for determining appropriate offsets 
or not. Rega (2013) identified the establishment of “sound but ‘ready to use’ 
methods and metrics” as one of two matters to be most urgently addressed with 
respect to ecological compensation in Italy. Conversely, many participants in our 
research voiced concern that the introduction of nascent methods would not keep 
pace with technical development of the field, thus potentially creating perverse 
outcomes. This mix of views is reflected in international experience where some 
jurisdictions choose to prescribe methods, with others expressly resisting, on the 
basis that prescribed methods would tend to constrain evolution of practice while 
a more flexible, principle-based approach tends to produce better outcomes 
(McKenney & Kiesecker 2010). 
A National Environmental Standard ranked highest as the most appropriate legal 
tool to address ecological compensation in New Zealand, although a National 
Policy Statement and ‘no response’ ranked similar. While a full legal analysis of 
the appropriate method would be necessary, the preference of stakeholders is 
relevant. National Policy Statements and National Environmental Standards are 
tools available under section 43 of the RMA that enable central government to 
influence the wording and content of lower level planning instruments 
administered by local and regional government. Responses did reflect that the 
rules-based practicality of a National Environmental Standard and the policy level 
approach of a National Policy Statement are recognised as having similar value, 
so perhaps a combination of the two might be a useful approach. Around the 
world, there has been a proliferation of policy approaches to addressing ecological 
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compensation (Burgin 2008; McKenney & Kiesecker 2010; Memon et al. 2004; 
Rundcrantz & Skarback 2003) which New Zealand can draw from to inform 
domestic responses 
Is there evidence of divergence in views across the range of sectors represented 
in the sample? 
In several cases, the uneven and often low representation of sectors meant 
statistical tests for differences in views were not able to be carried out. We include 
raw response data to the five key open responses in the Supplementary material to 
demonstrate that although statistically significant differences were not common, 
some divergence was apparent from the raw frequency data. The relative lack of 
divergence among the sectors that was observed in responses to questions 
regarding implementation suggests that the key failings are well-recognised and 
widely understood by practitioners, regardless of sector membership. Divergence 
of views existed more with respect to the way in which the concept could be more 
formally addressed, although a desire for policy still captured majority support. 
The degree of disparity between responses across different sectors was certainly 
lower than expected, with most responses evidencing broadly similar perspectives 
on key matters. Different views in how the concept could be formally addressed 
suggest that wide consultation with stakeholders is likely to be an important 
element of successful policy development and implementation.  
Ecological compensation has strong support in New Zealand, reflecting broad 
international acceptance of the concept. However, consistent with international 
experience, widespread concern about current implementation standards and a 
desire for a more formalised approaches are desired. It is our view, supported by 
the weight of the opinion sourced in the interview programme, that ecological 
compensation is a necessary tool in resource management in New Zealand, and 
holds promise if utilised credibly and with appropriate checks and balances in 
place. We suggest that a resource management context that does not explicitly and 
sufficiently support ecological compensation is unlikely to generate positive 
outcomes and adequately recognise the promise of the concept. We also suggest 
that a formal policy approach must occur in tandem with moves to address the 
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many implementation issues highlighted in the interview responses and the wider 
literature. 
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6.9 Supplementary data appendix 
6.9.1 Supplementary data file 1- Interview questions 
1 
What is your understanding of the purpose of ecological 
compensation in an RMA context?* 
2 
What methods of implementing ecological compensation are you 
familiar with?* (read key ones and invite to add more) 
3 
What are the potential advantages or positive aspects of ecological 
compensation?  
4 
What are the potential disadvantages, negatives or risks of ecological 
compensation?  
5 
What are the barriers to successful implementation of ecological 
compensation?   
6 
Are you aware of an example of successful implementation of 
ecological compensation and what were the critical success factors?* 
7 
Are you aware of an example of unsuccessful implementation and 
what in your view, were the principal reasons it was not successful?* 
8 
'Like for like' exchange of values is one of the key premises of 
ecological compensation. Which of these best describes your 
perspective in considering how important similarities of exchange 
elements are? [Scale of 1 (not important) – 4 (non-negotiable)] 
9 
Are there ecosystems or ecosystem types in which ecological 
compensation should be provided for to a greater or lesser degree?* 
10 
What key considerations do you make in establishing the 
appropriateness of a compensation option?  
11 National level policy guidance has been called for in relation to 
ecological compensation. What matters do you consider such 
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guidance should address? 
 
11a. If policy guidance is developed, would you consider it 
appropriate for it to contain prescribed methods for quantifying 
mitigation/offsets? Why/why not?* 
 
11b. If that guidance was produced would you consider it appropriate 
for it to be statutory as opposed to non-statutory, and (if any) which 
of the following  legal tool/method would be the most appropriate to 
deliver this policy guidance? 
12 
The basis of the RMA is sustainable management. Does ecological 
compensation as a concept contribute to sustainable management? 
13 
Do you have any other ideas as to how the use or implementation of 
ecological compensation could be improved?* 
14 
To what extent do you support the use of ecological compensation 
under the RMA? [Scale of 1 (do not support) to 4 (generally support)] 
 
 ANY OTHER COMMENTS 
NB: (*) question not subject to formal analysis 
133 
 
6.9.2 Supplementary data file 2 – Additional data 
Advantages 
Planning & 
Policy (21) 
Enviro 
consult (28) 
Enviro govt 
(27) 
Enviro research 
(14) Advocacy (5) Business (15) Law (6) Total 
Biodiversity benefits and the overall reduction in 
environmental impacts 28 (46.7) 43 (58.1) 37 (50.0) 19 (44.2) 8 (80.0) 16 (38.1) 6 (37.5) 157 (49.2) 
Better integration of environmental considerations 
in development 14 (23.3) 12 (16.2) 21 (28.4) 8 (18.6) 2 (20.0) 5 (11.9) 3 (18.6) 65 (20.4) 
Stakeholders benefits 5 (8.3) 7 (9.5) 3 (4.1) 4 (9.3) 0 (0.0) 7 (16.7) 2 (12.5) 28 (8.8) 
Communication and relationship building (social 
outcomes) 1 (1.7) 6 (8.1) 2 (2.7) 5 (11.6) 0 (0.0) 4 (9.5) 1 (6.25) 19 (6.0) 
Flexibility and innovation 4 (6.7) 3 (4.1) 4 (5.4) 2 (4.7) 0 (0.0) 3 (7.1) 2 (12.5) 18 (5.6) 
Allows development to proceed 5 (8.3) 2 (2.7) 6 (8.1) 5 (11.6) 0 (0.0) 6 (14.3) 2 (12.5) 26 (8.2) 
Other 3 (5.0) 1 (1.3) 1 (1.3) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (2.4) 0 (0.0) 6 (1.9) 
Number of participants that didn't respond 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
 Total 60 74 74 43 10 42 16 319 
Percentage total responses 18.80% 23.20% 23.20% 13.50% 3.10% 13.20% 5.00% 
 Total number of themes identified 7 7 7 6 2 7 6  
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Disadvantages 
Planning & 
Policy (n=21) 
Enviro consult 
(n=28) 
Enviro govt 
(n=27) 
Enviro research 
(n=14) 
Advocacy 
(n=5) 
Business 
(n=15) Law (n=6) 
Total 
(n=116) 
Poorly planned exchanges 3 (4.4) 10 (9.8) 18 (18.4) 6 (8.6) 1 (6.7) 4 (8.2) 3 (10.3) 45 (10.5) 
Poor security for gains/exchanges 11 (16.4) 12 (11.8) 14 (14.3) 10 (14.3) 2 (13.3) 10 (20.4) 7 (24.1) 66 (15.3) 
Ecological limitations 8 (11.9) 17 (16.7) 5 (5.1) 6 (8.6) 0 (0.0) 1 (2.0) 5 (17.2) 42 (9.7) 
Poor implementation mean aspirations are not 
met 6 (9.0) 8 (7.8) 4 (4.1) 8 (11.4) 3 (20.0) 5 (10.2) 1 (3.4) 35 (8.1) 
Lack of transparency and misuse of the concept 14 (21.0) 17 (16.7) 13 (13.3) 7 (10) 3 (20.0) 8 (16.3) 4 (13.8) 66 (15.3) 
Resource requirements 2 (3.0) 7 (6.9) 6 (6.1) 3 (4.3) 0 (0.0) 8 (16.3) 3 (10.3) 29 (6.7) 
Lack of strategic planning underpinning usage 0 (0.0) 3 (2.9) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.4) 1 (6.7) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 6 (1.4) 
Lack of guidance, policy and tools 8 (11.9) 12 (11.8) 19 (19.4) 9 (12.8) 0 (0.0) 10 (20.4) 5 (17.2) 63 (14.7) 
Additional pressure on biodiversity 11 (16.4) 15 (14.7) 15 (15.3) 12 (17.1) 3 (20.0) 2 (4.1) 0 (0.0) 58 (13.5) 
Resistance to the concept and other 
communication issues 4 (6.0) 1 (1.0) 3 (3.1) 8 (11.4) 2 (13.3) 1 (2.0) 1 (3.4) 20 (4.7) 
Total 67 102 98 70 15 49 29 430 
Number of participants that didn't respond 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
 Percentage total responses 15.6 23.7 22.8 16.3 3.5 11.4 6.7 
 Total number of themes identified 9 10 10 10 7 9 8  
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Barriers 
Planning & 
Policy (n=21) 
Enviro consult 
(n=28) 
Enviro govt 
(n=27) 
Enviro research 
(n=14) 
Advocacy 
(n=5) Business (n=15) Law (n=6) 
Total 
(n=116) 
Agency and operational failings 11 (12.2) 17 (12.9) 12 (10.2) 9 (14.8) 3 (17.6) 10 (14.9) 4 (18.2) 66 (13.0) 
Appropriate science and expertise not available or 
used 8 (2.9) 9 (6.8) 10 (8.5) 5 (8.2) 1 (5.9) 4 (6.0) 2 (9.1) 39 (7.7) 
Lack of willingness to pay/resource 12 (13.3) 15 (11.4) 13 (11.0) 5 (8.2) 0 (0.0) 10 (14.9) 3 (13.6) 58 (11.4) 
Lack of guidance, tools and framework for decision-
making 13 (14.4) 30 (22.7) 28 (23.7) 10 (16.4) 4 (23.5) 11 (16.4) 6 (27.3) 102 (20.1) 
Poor use or misunderstanding/misappropriation of 
the concept 4 (4.4) 7 (5.3) 7 (5.9) 7 (11.5) 2 (11.8) 5 (7.5) 2 (9.1) 34 (6.7) 
Lack of strategic planning 2 (2.2) 5 (3.8) 3 (2.5) 2 (3.3) 1 (5.9) 2 (3.0) 0 (0.0) 15 (3.0) 
Lack of follow-up and security 18 (20) 21 (15.9) 16 (13.6) 7 (11.5) 2 (11.8) 9 (13.4) 2 (9.1) 75 (14.8) 
Resource intensive to plan and carry out 11 (12.2) 13 (9.8) 4 (3.4) 3 (4.9) 2 (11.8) 5 (7.5) 2 (9.1) 40 (7.9) 
Poor communication 5 (5.6) 6 (4.5) 7 (5.9) 8 (13.1) 1 (5.9) 8 (11.9) 0 (0.0) 35 (6.9) 
Ecological limitations 6 (6.7) 9 (6.8) 18 (15.3) 5 (8.2) 1 (5.9) 3 (4.5) 1 (4.5) 43 (8.5) 
Total 90 132 118 61 17 67 22 507 
Number of participants that didn't respond 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Percentage total responses 17.7 26 23.3 12 3.4 13.2 4.3 
 Total number of themes identified 10 10 10 10 9 10 8  
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Key considerations 
Planning & 
Policy (n=21) 
Enviro consult 
(n=28) 
Enviro govt 
(n=27) 
Enviro research 
(n=14) Advocacy (n=5) Business (n=15) Law (n=6) Total (n=116) 
Monitoring and follow-up/security is provided for 7 (9.3) 14 (15.2) 15 (15.6) 10 (24.4) 4 (23.5) 6 (11.5) 1 (9.1) 57 
Strategic gain, considering spatial context 6 (8.0) 10 (10.9) 16 (16.7) 4 (9.8) 2 (11.8) 5 (9.6) 1 (9.1) 44 
Value of what is being lost, significance etc 24 (32) 22 (23.9) 26 (27.1) 8 (19.5) 6 (35.3) 9 (17.3) 1 (9.1) 96 
Guidance, policy, precedent 4 (5.3) 2 (2.2) 5 (5.2) 2 (4.9) 0 (0.0) 3 (5.8) 2 (18.2) 18 
Resource requirements 3 (4.0) 5 (5.4) 2 (2.1) 2 (4.9) 0 (0.0) 8 (15.4) 0 (0.0) 20 
Fair and appropriate exchange 20 (26.7) 27 (29.3) 23 (24.0) 12 (29.3) 2 (11.8) 12 (23.1) 6 (54.5) 102 
Ecological constraints 7 (9.3) 6 (6.5) 5 (5.2) 1 (2.4) 2 (11.8) 3 (5.8) 0 (0.0) 24 
Well managed process 4 (5.3) 6 (6.5) 4 (4.2) 2 (4.9) 1 (5.9) 6 (11.6) 0 (0.0) 23 
Total 75 92 96 41 17 52 11 384 
Number of participants that didn't respond 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
 Percentage total responses 19.5 24 25 10.7 4.4 13.5 2.9 
 
Total number of themes identified 8 8 8 8 6 8 5   
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Guidance content 
Planning & 
Policy (n=21) 
Enviro 
consult 
(n=28) 
Enviro 
govt 
(n=27) 
Enviro 
research 
(n=14) 
Advocacy 
(n=5) 
Business 
(n=15) 
Law 
(n=6) 
Total 
(n=116) 
Clear and specific principles (remove ambiguity 
from key concepts) 21 (26.3) 28 (28.6) 29 (30.2) 14 (25) 4 (25.0) 13 (25.5) 5 (27.8) 114 
Worked examples, case studies, operational 
approach 7 (8.8) 6 (6.1) 8 (8.3) 3 (5.4) 2 (12.5) 1 (2.0) 0 (0.0) 27 
Standardised decision-making framework 18 (22.5) 16 (16.3) 20 (20.8) 9 (16.1) 4 (25.0) 9 (17.6) 3 (16.7) 79 
Tools and methods and guidance on expected 
detail 13 (16.3) 14 (14.3) 11 (11.5) 12 (21.4) 1 (6.25) 10 (19.6) 2 (11.1) 63 
Acknowledge existing structures, sources of 
information and processes (integrate) 8 (10) 9 (9.2) 2 (2.1) 4 (7.1) 1 (6.25) 1 (2.0) 2 (11.1) 27 
Appropriately define and resource respective 
roles 0 (0.0) 5 (5.1) 7 (7.3) 2 (3.6) 2 (12.5) 3 (5.9) 0 (0.0) 19 
Flexible, open to innovation and use at different 
scales and in different situations 6 (7.5) 8 (8.2) 8 (8.3) 2 (3.6) 1 (6.25) 8 (15.7) 3 (16.7) 36 
Security and monitoring/follow-up 5 (6.25) 8 (8.2) 11 (11.5) 8 (14.3) 1 (6.25) 4 (7.8) 1 (5.6) 38 
Engagement and communication through 
drafting and review 2 (2.5) 4 (4.1) 0 (0.0) 2 (3.6) 0 (0.0) 2 (3.9) 2 (11.1) 12 
Total 80 98 96 56 16 51 18 415 
Number of participants that didn't respond 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 
 Percentage total responses 19.3 23.6 23.1 13.5 3.9 12.3 4.3 
 Total number of themes identified 8 9 8 9 8 9 7  
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Chapter 7  
Synthesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1 Research summary 
This thesis has added to understanding of the use of ecological compensation in 
New Zealand under the Resource Management Act 1991 and contributed to the 
international literature on use of compensatory mechanisms for ecological harm. 
It has identified the levels of regulatory compliance with requirements 
(Compliance study: Chapter 4), the nature of those requirements (Practice study: 
Chapter 5) and the perspectives of stakeholders regarding the use of the 
mechanism now and in the future (Stakeholder Perspectives study: Chapter 6). 
Applying an empirical approach, it has quantified the current state of practice in 
New Zealand from the perspectives of reviews into compliance, an evaluation of 
practice and the views of practitioners and stakeholders, indicating opportunities 
for improvements and innovations. It has also provided an opportunity to compare 
and contrast the New Zealand experience with the international context and to 
contribute to the international fields of environmental impact assessment, 
regulatory implementation and policy development.  
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7.1.1 Compliance study 
Key question 1: What are the levels of compliance with ecological compensation 
requirements in consents under the Resource Management Act 1991, and how 
might variation in compliance levels be explained? 
Rates of regulatory compliance were shown to be 64.8% (Brown et al., 2013) 
which is consistent with observations internationally that demonstrate that many 
requirements for ecological compensation are not met (Breaux et al., 2005; 
Hornyak & Halvorsen, 2003; Matthews & Endress, 2008; Tonkin & Taylor, 2012). 
The literature suggested that rates of compliance are not uniform across different 
types of requirements, applicants and activities (International Network for 
Environmental Compliance and Enforcement, 2009; Ministry for the Environment, 
2008; Shimshack, 2007). Tests were conducted for correlations with compliance, 
and included selected variables in the planning process that we expected would 
influence levels of compliance with the consent conditions. Results confirmed that, 
as expected, compliance was not uniform and that some variables in the planning 
process showed strong relationships with compliance (Brown, et al., 2013). These 
findings suggest that a deeper understanding of the nature of compliance in the 
relevant jurisdiction can help guide agencies in addressing instances of non-
compliance, by ensuring  adequate resourcing of monitoring and enforcement 
activities. This thesis contributes to the New Zealand literature with the first 
systematic and empirical study of compliance with ecological compensation 
requirements. It also contributes to the domestic and international literature by 
demonstrating the non-uniformity of non-compliance, analysing the variables that 
correlate with actual levels of compliance and further demonstrating the critical 
importance of on-going monitoring in environmental impact assessment. 
7.1.2 Practice study 
Key question 2: How is ecological compensation considered in practice by 
agencies under the RMA, with respect to key implementation issues? 
The use of ecological compensation as a policy tool in New Zealand is ad hoc and 
highly variable (Memon & Skelton, 2004). Using the framework outlined by 
McKenney and Kiesecker (2010) this part of the research demonstrated how 
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matters of equivalency, spatial proximity, timing, additionality, duration, 
compliance, currencies and ratios are addressed in practice in New Zealand, with 
respect to 110 sampled resource consents. This investigation is an objective 
analysis of the agreements presently being reached under the RMA. It provides 
suggestions for how the present implementation could be improved in respect of 
each issue identified in the planning process.  
This investigation revealed considerable scope for improvement and innovation, 
including by demonstrating that a lack of guidance and standards for assessment 
has made monitoring of outcomes difficult, and consistency between decisions 
difficult to achieve. This thesis contributes to the New Zealand and international 
literature by developing a quantified understanding of the practice of ecological 
compensation within the current policy vacuum in New Zealand, while 
demonstrating the importance of clear goals when evaluating success or failure of 
implementation.   
7.1.3 Stakeholder Perspectives study 
Key question 3: What are the perspectives of stakeholders on the implementation 
of ecological compensation under the RMA and the possible improvements that 
are required? 
The piecemeal application and implementation of ecological compensation in 
New Zealand continues. It seems the use of ecological compensation as a resource 
management mechanism is increasing in both frequency and profile. Engaging 
with practitioners and stakeholders involved in the implementation of ecological 
compensation was a very useful exercise and demonstrated the depth of 
knowledge and experience that exists in New Zealand. The interviews reflected 
broad agreement as to the promise and the concerns regarding the use of 
ecological compensation across the sectors and a strong appetite for research and 
discussion. Concern about the integrity of implementation were ubiquitous and 
most participants were of the view that formalization of the mechanism (either 
through policy or guidance) is a crucial step to increase the quality of 
implementation. This study is the first systematic collection of perspectives on the 
application and implementation of ecological compensation in New Zealand. 
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7.2 Research implications for ecological compensation in New Zealand 
7.2.1 Insufficient on-going monitoring  
This thesis has demonstrated that the obligations related to ecological 
compensation in consents are insufficiently monitored, with agencies allocating 
too little resource to on-going monitoring and enforcement. Poor follow-up results 
in greater risk of negative impacts on the environment and a failure to fulfil the 
expectations of the community with respect to the statutory roles of those agencies. 
The analysis further demonstrates that improved security of exchange is needed to 
better ensure that ecological compensation is carried out on a case-by-case basis. 
A range of existing tools are  available to help secure exchanges, from ensuring 
practical and clearly worded conditions of consent, through to more formal tools 
such as RMA bonds and covenants. Better security of exchange is likely to require 
a combination of improved use of existing tools and the innovation of additional 
tools and strategies. Predictors of compliance exist with respect to variables in the 
planning process along with the nature of the applicant, condition and activity 
type. This information is important because it demonstrates the value of 
understanding the nature of non-compliance in a given area to assist in prioritising 
resources to monitor and address it.  
7.2.2 Formalization of approach is needed 
This research determined that ecological compensation is used commonly 
throughout New Zealand under the RMA and there is a clear appetite for its 
continuing place in resource management. However, the ad hoc and piecemeal 
application of the concept appears to be significantly limiting its potential to 
contribute to improved resource management and to enable effective monitoring. 
A formal approach would be a crucial opportunity to define the expectations of 
this policy tool and put in place clear and measurable goals for its use (Bekessy et 
al., 2010; Memon & Skelton, 2004; Race & Fonseca, 1996; Rega, 2013). Clear 
goals and guidelines for applying the concept will also enhance the ability to 
monitor outcomes in the future and determine success or failure.  
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Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that the present approach separating 
biodiversity offsets from the rest of ecological compensation may well be having 
perverse consequences. The focus of policy development at regional levels and 
the recent guidance in Draft prepared by the Department of Conservation is on 
‘biodiversity offsets’. These apparently distinct instruments are usually held to 
higher account in practice with respect to demonstrating ‘no let loss’ and ‘like for 
like’ conclusions. However, should the tests for those more rigorous thresholds 
not be met, there is little recourse for an agency or community. The regulatory 
context does not demand such tests are met, and the default becomes the loose 
application of some other measure of ecological compensation, a still open 
pathway that is characterised by rudimentary analysis and likely negative 
ecological consequences. This is not a suggestion to loosen requirements for 
biodiversity offsets: somewhat the opposite. It suggests that if significant 
environmental protection and enhancement is to be achieved with ecological 
compensation (its purported chief benefit) then the standards expected of 
offsetting (like for like, no net loss etc – see Chapter 5) must necessarily apply 
much more broadly to all instances of ecological compensation. The current 
declining condition of biodiversity in New Zealand makes an ongoing tolerance 
for poor exchanges leading to a consistent net loss of biodiversity, untenable. 
7.2.3 Implementation improvements must underpin policy improvements 
The present research has revealed significant issues with the implementation of 
ecological compensation under the Resource Management Act 1991 that are 
unlikely to be sufficiently addressed simply by the introduction of a formal policy 
approach. The Compliance study reflected significant levels of non-compliance, 
the Practice study highlighted areas for improvement and innovation. The 
Stakeholder Perspectives study then showed that stakeholders overwhelmingly 
highlight poor implementation as the chief constraint on the performance of 
ecological compensation. Throughout the study it was noted that poor information 
management by agencies was likely constraining outcomes.  
When discussing potential case studies with agencies, it was clear that staff were 
unsure of how commonly ecological compensation was applied in consent 
processing. Chapter 4 (Compliance study) also showed that several cases that 
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were proposed to be included were removed from the sample due to insufficient 
information being present. Chapter 5 (Practice study) also noted that many cases 
contained insufficient information to compare exchanges and to determine 
equivalency. The introduction of a more formalised approach is unlikely to 
improve outcomes significantly unless it is coupled with improvements in 
underlying resource management systems by way of increased innovation, more 
research into methods and tools, and increased resourcing for monitoring and 
enforcement. 
At present, the use of ecological compensation is not formally monitored. 
Monitoring and reporting of its use would provide a basis from which 
improvements could be made, and provide for auditing and review of decision-
making. We recommend that ecological compensation agreements are specifically 
recorded and reported on an agency and preferably a national basis to enable 
review, monitoring and evaluation. 
7.3 Directions for further research 
7.3.1 Agency administration 
The Compliance and Practice studies both reflected significant scope for 
improvement in the way ecological compensation is administered by agencies. 
The Stakeholder Perspectives study showed that 13% of responses highlighted 
agency and operational failure as a significant barrier to success of ecological 
compensation, and 10.5% of responses noted poor planning of exchanges as a 
common disadvantage. There are clear indications that agency resourcing, culture 
and behaviour have a significant impact on the processes of the determination of 
appropriate compensation, the formulation of agreements, and the prioritisation of 
follow-up and monitoring. Further research could examine the role of the agency 
in the field of ecological compensation and test predictions of agency and public 
choice theory in respect of the management of ecological compensation.  
7.3.2 Retrospective requirements 
Several of the case studies encountered were retrospective resource consents, 
issued to legitimise illegal activities. In this way, it would seem that proposals for 
ecological compensation as conditions of such consents are being requested by 
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agencies as an alternative to litigation. From discussions with agency officers and 
applicants, it was determined that the benefit of this approach was that the 
environmental effects received primary attention, because limited agency 
resources could be focussed upon addressing the damage rather than undertaking 
administration of prosecution. Analysing the manner in which ecological 
compensation is applied in this context would be useful; to shed light on how the 
outcomes of enforcement using a reparative pathway of compensatory works 
might differ from one where traditional prosecution is pursued. 
7.3.3 Tools and methods 
This thesis demonstrates that there is clear scope for development of further 
decision-support tools, methods for the assessment of ecological compensation, 
and assessment methods for supporting determination of compliance and success. 
The Stakeholder Perspectives study shows that stakeholders have very mixed 
views on the potential of prescribed methods in determining ecological 
compensation; however most participants agreed that further standardisation, tools, 
currencies and practical guidelines are essential. This reflects studies elsewhere 
which note the importance of the availability of sound and accepted methods to 
determine ecological compensation (Rega, 2013). The results showed that very 
few standard methods and currencies were in use at present in New Zealand. 
Further research could investigate the validity and reliability of existing tools, 
making improvements where necessary, and could contribute to creating robust 
and defensible new techniques. New tools should be accompanied by sufficient 
technical support, baseline information and guidance on appropriate use (Gardner 
& von Hase, 2012).  
7.3.4 Ecological outcomes 
The Compliance study assessed compliance with regulatory requirements which 
may or may not have included specific criteria to meet ecological outcomes. This 
research confirms that satisfactory compliance and ecological success are 
sometimes poorly correlated as is outlined in Matthews and Endress (2008). 
Research into the ecological outcomes being generated would be useful to 
demonstrate further the extent to which agreements for ecological compensation 
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are likely to be of benefit to the environment and how they might be evaluated 
(Breaux, et al., 2005).  
7.3.5 Improved security 
Strategies and improved safeguards to enhance compliance levels and increase 
efficiency and effectiveness of on-going monitoring are necessary to improve the 
implementation of ecological compensation. The field of enforcement as it applies 
to the environment is typically poorly understood (Keane et al., 2008), and 
follow-up of requirements in practice is particularly rare. Further research into 
post-approval implementation of ecological compensation is much needed, 
including improvement of tools and methods of securing exchanges and 
development of the understanding of drivers of non-compliance. 
7.3.6 Delivery methods 
The ad hoc application of ecological compensation in New Zealand is likely 
generating negative ecological outcomes, as it has in the United States and 
elsewhere (e.g. Salzman & Ruhl 2000). Further innovation in methods of delivery 
of ecological compensation is needed, particularly of those that provide ecological 
compensation in advance and that aggregate more than one ecological 
compensation effort. Ecological compensation secured in advance, assists in 
reducing uncertainty for all parties by requiring that gains be demonstrated at least 
in part prior to approval being given (Gardner & von Hase, 2012; Greer & Som, 
2010). Innovation is already occurring, with mitigation trusts and other aggregated 
models of mitigation delivery appearing throughout New Zealand and being the 
main means by which off-site exchanges are currently managed (Brown, et al., 
2013).  
Such approaches have been shown overseas to generate better ecological 
outcomes than many piecemeal projects, as biodiversity values are context-
dependent (Breaux, et al., 2005; Gardner & von Hase, 2012). As outlined in the 
Practice study, it is critical that establishment of landscape-level programmes 
includes reference to key implementation issues (McKenney & Kiesecker, 2010), 
and is subject to regular on-going monitoring and evaluation. There is ample 
scope to integrate consideration of ecological compensation with wider work 
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programmes informed by systematic conservation planning (Margules & Pressey, 
2000). 
7.4 Concluding remarks 
This thesis has applied systematic, empirical assessment methods to characterise 
the recent application and implementation of ecological compensation under the 
RMA. It has demonstrated the importance of applied, empirical approaches to 
evaluating the outcomes of ecological compensation. In the Introduction, I 
showed that ecological compensation has significant inherent shortcomings. 
Theory predicts that poor policy, weak exchanges, and lax enforcement see permit 
approval placed ahead of environmental protection, and economic gain ahead of 
biodiversity enhancement. The three key studies of the present research have 
demonstrated that the expected concerns are materialising in New Zealand, and 
that change and action is needed to address this. The management 
recommendations discussed above would help to ‘correct the context’, making 
positive outcomes more likely. The suggestions for further research would 
enhance our understanding of ecological compensation in New Zealand also. 
A formal and statutory policy framework will be an essential element of 
improvements, helping to set out expectations of ecological compensation and 
expectations of the stakeholders implementing the concept. Enhanced safeguards 
to ensure the security of exchanges agreed upon will be a critical dimension of 
any improvements. It is also suggested that calls to remove the possibility of 
considering ecological compensation in most cases, are likely to result in reduced 
compensation, not reduced adverse effects due to the degree of pressure for 
economic development and resource extraction. Ecological compensation relies 
on a strong resource management system that adequately resources assessment, 
negotiation and on-going monitoring of agreements. The present research 
provides robust evidence that significant improvement is needed for the potential 
of ecological compensation to be harnessed in New Zealand.  
To continue implementing the mechanism in a policy vacuum, with limited 
controls on exchanges, with weak follow-up, is almost certain to waste the 
significant resource expended during planning processes and result in the on-
going erosion of natural capital. Stronger standards for ecological compensation 
151 
 
are needed in both policy and regulation, and should be applied across the board 
to all forms of ecological compensation.  
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Appendix 1 – Field Sheet 1 
GENERAL COVER SHEET – APPENDIX 1 
Site Number Site Address 
 
 
 
Map Ref 
Legal Description Certificate of title # 
Common Name GPS entrance 
Key contact details 
 
Applicant description 
Brief description of site and associated development 
 
Specific plan references of note 
 
Relevant consents under RMA issued   
Land Ownership Changes 
Code Agency Main activity permitted Date Old Owner/Date 
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Appendix 2 – Field Sheet 2 
 
ECOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT – APPENDIX 2 
Site Number Site Address 
Date/Time 
  
Brief description of site 
 
 
 
Site Area  
Notable Features 
 
Additional site information from other sources with respect to ecological matters (i.e. 
LENZ etc) 
Changes to the wider landscape or catchment relevant to the development or 
immediate area 
Main use of the site prior Main use of the site after 
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Appendix 3 – Field Sheet 3 
  
QUESTION Y/N NOTES 
Was there a significant operational process 
that the application was subject to that may 
have had an impact upon the compensation 
requirements? 
  
Was there a policy or plan provision, or one 
from another document (such as a 
Biodiversity Strategy) that specifically 
addressed compensation? 
  
If yes, did that have a material impact on the 
nature of the compensation required? 
  
Were independent hearing commissioners 
utilised in the planning process? 
  
 
 
Was the proposal notified?   
 
 
Was the proposal litigated?   
 
 
Was a professional ecologist used in any 
stage of the process to consider the relevant 
environmental effects? 
  
Was the issue of compensation broached 
early in the process? 
  
Was the compensation proposed by the 
applicant? 
 
  
 
 
Was the negotiation for compensation 
carried out with the processing planner 
present? 
  
Was the proposed compensation 
determined prior to granting of the consent? 
 
  
How was the compensation agreed upon 
(i.e. what type of process e.g. voluntary, 
covenant, consent condition etc) 
  
 
 
Were there monitoring requirements 
incorporated for the term of the 
compensation? 
  
Were there any special elements in the 
monitoring that are likely to have 
contributed to the success or failure (i.e. 
expert panels, PRPs) 
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Appendix 4 – Field Sheet 4 
COMPENSATION ASSESSMENT – APPENDIX FIVE 
Site Number Site Address/Name 
 
 
Consent Number 
 
Agency 
 
Activity Allowed/Nature of Adverse effect 
 
 
 
 
 
Date of Application 
 
Date of Granting  
Compensation negotiated (summary of activities to avoid – remedy – mitigate – offset) 
Avoid 
 
 
 
Remedy 
 
 
 
In kind Out of kind 
Mitigate 
 
 
 
 
 
Offset 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Onsite compensation 
 
 
 
 
 
Offsite compensation 
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SIX KEY IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
1. Equivalence of impact and gain 
 
 
 
2. Location of the compensation (spatial proximity) 
 
 
 
3. How ‘additional’ the compensation is, and what types of compensation is it? 
 
 
 
4. Timing of benefits of compensation vs. Impacts 
 
 
 
5. Offset duration and compliance (what types of duration, security, requirements 
are there?) 
 
 
 
6. How was the mitigation established or calculated? 
 
 
 
APPLIES TO AGREEMENTS OUTSIDE OF CONSENT ADDRESSED IN APPENDIX 2 (IE MoUs) 
Agreement ID  
Condition No: Text 
 
 
 
Grade 1 - 5  Notes regarding compliance with offset requirement 
 
 
 
Agreement ID  
Condition No: Text 
 
 
 
Grade 1 - 5  Notes regarding compliance with offset requirement 
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Appendix 5 – Field Sheet 5 
COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT – APPENDIX SIX 
Site Number 
 
Site Address/Name 
 
 Date/Time of Visit 
 
 Contact Name Contact Number 
Agency   
Applicant   
Consultant/3rd Party   
 
Consents under RMA issued (Agency, year granted, 
year implemented) 
Consents issued under other 
Acts (Agency, year granted) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Compliance spectrum (make detailed notes) 
 
0 – No compliance/condition dismissed/changed  
1 – Minimal level of compliance  
2 – Below satisfactory level of compliance 
3 – Satisfactory compliance 
 
Consent Number 
Condition Numbers  
Condition No: Text 
 
 
 
Grade 0-4  Notes regarding compliance 
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Consent Number  
Condition No: Text 
 
 
 
Grade 0-4  Notes regarding compliance 
 
 
Consent Number  
Condition No: Text 
 
 
 
Grade 0-4  Notes regarding compliance 
 
 
Consent Number  
Condition No: Text 
 
 
 
Grade 0-4  Notes regarding compliance 
 
 
Consent Number  
Condition No: Text 
 
 
 
Grade 0-4  Notes regarding compliance 
 
 
Consent Number  
Condition No: Text 
 
 
 
Grade 0-4  Notes regarding compliance 
 
 
Consent Number  
Condition No: Text 
 
 
Grade 0-4  Notes regarding compliance 
 
 
 
 
